The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
… Iraq
refused to admit UN inspectors after a clear ultimatum by the
Security
Council;
or
•
the UN
inspectors were re-admitted to Iraq and found sufficient evidence
of
WMD
activity or were again expelled trying to do so.” 100
296.
If the options
for tougher containment or regime change were developed
further
a “full
opinion should be sought from the Law Officers”.
297.
The Cabinet
Office paper concluded that the use of overriding force in
a
ground
campaign was the only option to offer confidence that Saddam
Hussein
would be
removed and bring Iraq back into the international
community.
298.
That would
require a staged approach and the US should be
encouraged
to consult
widely on its plans.
299.
In its
“Conclusions”, the Cabinet Office paper stated:
“… despite
the considerable difficulties, the use of overriding force in a
ground
campaign is
the only option that we can be confident will remove Saddam and
bring
Iraq back
into the international community.”
300.
The elements
of a staged approach comprised:
“•
winding up
the pressure: increasing the pressure on Saddam through
tougher
containment.
Stricter implementation of sanctions and a military build-up
will
frighten
his regime. A refusal to admit UN inspectors, or their admission
and
subsequent
likely frustration, which resulted in an appropriate finding by
the
Security
Council, could provide the justification for military action.
Saddam would
try to
prevent this, although he has miscalculated before;
•
careful
planning: …
•
coalition
building: … Special attention will need to be paid to moderate
Arab
states and
to Iran;
•
incentives:
… guarantees will need to be made with regard to Iraqi
territorial
integrity.
Plans should be worked up in advance of the great benefits
the
international
community could provide for a post-Saddam Iraq and its
people.
These
should be published;
•
tackling
other regional issues: an effort to engage the US in a serious
effort
to re-energise
the MEPP …
•
sensitising
the public: a media campaign to warn of the dangers that
Saddam
poses and
to prepare public opinion both in the UK and abroad.”
301.
The Cabinet
Office paper ended with a statement that the US should
be
encouraged
to consult widely on its plans.
100
Paper
Cabinet Office, 8 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Options Paper’.
440