The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
412.
Mr Straw wrote
that it could be argued that “deterrence and containment
had
worked up
to now: what was the case that argued they would not work in
future?”
He also
pointed out that the regional reactions were “All too clear, I
fear, unless a
stronger
case is better made.” Mr Straw added his own concern about “the
survival of
your
government” because of unease in both the Cabinet and the PLP; and
the desire
for “a case
which has yet to be made”. Without that, Mr Straw advised “the most
serious
divisions
would open up”.
413.
In his memoir,
Mr Straw wrote that the letter had “set out the hazards ahead if
our
handling of
Iraq went wrong” and that it had ended: “And you know where some
(not so
loyal) are
on all this. Licking their lips at the possibility of regime change
nearer home.”160
414.
Mr Blair
commented to officials in No.10:
“I entirely
agree with all this. But it is hard to see the way through, unless
we just
don’t do
it. But I think it’s right to do it.”161
415.
Mr Blair sent
President Bush a “Note on Iraq” on 28 July.162
“I will be
with you, whatever. But this is the moment to assess bluntly the
difficulties.
The
planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not
Kosovo.
This is
not Afghanistan. It is not even the Gulf War.
“The
military part of this is hazardous but I will concentrate mainly on
the political
context for
success.”
417.
Mr Blair
stated that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was:
“… the
right thing to do. He is a potential threat. He could be
contained.
But containment
… is always risky. His departure would free up the
region.
And his
regime is … brutal and inhumane …”
418.
Mr Blair wrote
that the first question was whether the US wanted or needed
a
coalition.
He stated that the US “could do it alone, with UK support”, but
drew attention
to the
dangers of “unintended consequences”, writing:
“Suppose it
got militarily tricky. Suppose Iraq suffered unexpected civilian
casualties.
Suppose the
Arab street finally erupted eg in […] Suppose Saddam felt
sufficiently
politically
strong, if militarily weak in conventional terms, to let off WMD.
Suppose
that,
without any coalition, the Iraqis feel ambivalent about being
invaded and
160
Straw
J. Last Man
Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan,
2012.
161
Manuscript
comment Blair to Powell on Letter (handwritten) Straw to Blair, 26
July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
162
Note Blair
[to Bush], 28 July 2002, ‘Note on Iraq’.
72