15.1 | Civilian
personnel
548.
Sir Peter
Ricketts supported that conclusion “from the perspective of our
relations
with Iraq”,
but asked that FCO Ministers be given the opportunity to “consider
the relative
importance
of continuing very high levels of FCO spending in Iraq as against
other
priorities”.362
Decisions
should not be pre‑empted by Whitehall processes before
that
had
happened. The FCO’s corporate systems were “not well developed for
making those
decisions
about relative priorities across the network”, but there would be
an opportunity
for the
Board to look at the issue later at the end of
November.
549.
Sir Peter
was “struck by the extremely high cost of maintaining a presence in
Erbil”.
He did not
believe it was possible to justify on value for money grounds a
large capital
investment
in the city. If the UK was to remain, it had to be on the basis of
co‑location
with
another EU country.
550.
On Basra,
Sir Peter expressed scepticism about what a very small post,
with
declining
interest from other departments, could achieve. Ministers needed to
be given
the option
of closure. If they would not accept that, the FCO should review
after
12 months
whether staff had been able to make any difference in
Basra.
551.
Officials
informed Mr Miliband on 8 December that the FCO Board had
decided
on 28
November that Ministers should be presented with two options for
Basra: a
mini‑mission
within a secure US military perimeter, to be reviewed again in
2009, or
closure
when UK forces left.363
There was a
strong case from a policy perspective for
retaining
the post, but Ministers would want to consider value for money in
the light
of wider
cost pressures. Mr Brown and DFID and Department of Energy and
Climate
Change
(DECC) Ministers were thought to be in favour of keeping Basra
open.
552.
Officials
explained that NSID(OD)364
would discuss
Iraq and Afghanistan on
9 December,
but that there would not be time for substantive discussion of
the
post‑drawdown
Iraq strategy. Mr Brown would invite Mr Miliband to seek
agreement
by
correspondence.
553.
NSID(OD)
discussed Iraq on 9 December 2008.365
554.
Papers
provided for the meeting included ‘Iraq: arrangements for
transition’.366
On the
network of posts, the paper stated:
“FCO will
retain a substantial Embassy in Baghdad at roughly current
levels
(20‑25 FCO
UK‑based staff), a small post in Erbil (4 UK staff – to be reviewed
again
in March
2009); and – subject to Ministers’ views – a small post in Basra
(3‑4 UK
staff, down
from 9 at present) until at least March 2010. Non‑staff running
costs in
362
Minute
Ricketts to Lyall-Grant, 10 November 2008, ‘Iraq Strategy from
2009’.
363
Minute IPU
[junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 8 December 2008,
‘NSID, 9 December: Iraq:
Steering
Brief’.
364
The
Overseas and Defence Sub‑Committee of the Committee on National
Security, International
Relations
and Defence (NSID(OD)) was the successor to DOP(I) as the principal
forum for Ministerial
discussion
on Iraq.
365
Minutes, 9
December 2008, NSID(OD) meeting.
366
Paper
Cabinet Office, 8 December 2008, ‘Iraq: arrangements for
transition’.
341