10.2 | Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009

444. The British Embassy Baghdad provided further advice on US views on

22 November.255 US Ambassador Dan Speckhard (Head of the IRMO) had told them that

Ambassador Khalilzad had no intention of running Iraq, but would not allow the mission

to fail because the Iraqi Government could not swiftly establish effective institutions at

national or local level. The UK should see PRTs as providing a “one-off structural shot

in the arm” to establish those institutions while international military forces remained to

support civilian activities.

445. Ambassador Speckhard had said that the US remained content for the UK to offer

a way forward in the South, but there were “clear red lines”:

• Civilian and military operations must be integrated.

• “[T]here must be a ‘genuine’ PRT in each province – satellite PRTs served by

resources located in another Governorate would not be an adequate option for

substantive not just political reasons.”

• PRTs must be a “new venture”, supported by additional resources. “Rebadging”

existing efforts under a PRT banner would not be well received.

446. The Embassy commented that it should be possible to present a proposal for four

PRTs transitioning to two as consistent with US objectives.

447. Following a visit to Iraq from 22 to 23 November, Gen Walker advised Dr Reid:

“The jury is out on the pilot PRTs – both amongst the military and the diplomats.

Whatever the outcome, I recommend an early bid to run them in the four

MND(SE) provinces to save us heartache later. If we don’t, they have the potential

to fix us through force protection requirements at places and for periods not

of our choosing.” 256

448. The DOP(I) meeting on 1 December considered an IPU paper on how the UK

should respond to the US proposal on PRTs.257

449. Mr Benn’s briefing for the meeting stated that, while the US wanted to see PRTs in

all of Iraq’s Provinces, financial constraints made it unlikely it would be able to establish

its own PRTs in the South.258

450. The IPU paper identified three options for the UK:

• Support four PRTs in the four southern provinces until 2008 (the US envisaged

that PRTs would operate for two years with international staff, and then for a

further two years with Iraqi staff only). That would “match” the US initiative, but

255 eGram Baghdad to FCO London, 22 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Update PRTs’.

256 Minute CDS to SofS [MOD], 25 November 2005, ‘CDS’s Visit to Iraq 22-23 Nov 05’.

257 Minutes, 1 December 2005, DOP(I) meeting.

258 Minute DFID [junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 29 November 2005, ‘Briefing for DOP(I),

1 December 2005 Meeting’ attaching Briefing DFID, 30 November 2005, ‘Flag B: Background Briefing’.

271