9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
331.
In his second
report from Baghdad, on 11 May, Mr Sawers wrote:
“No
progress is possible until security improves. Crime is widespread
(not surprising
as Saddam
released all the criminals last autumn). Car-jackings are endemic,
with
the cars
driven to Iran for sale. Last week the Ministry of Planning was
re-kitted
out ready
to resume work; that night it was looted again. The evening air is
full of
gunfire.
There is still a climate of fear on the streets, because of the
level of crime,
and that is
casting a shadow over all else.”204
332.
On 12 May,
reporting to the FCO on the political process, Mr Sawers
observed:
“Iraq’s
emerging political leaders are working together surprisingly well
and the
process is
gaining momentum. The Leadership Group of five has expanded
to
seven or
eight embracing two more important constituencies … They have a
Joint
Secretariat,
and their thinking is coalescing around plans for a National
Conference
which are
close to our own. They want an Interim Authority to be more like
a
transitional
government.”205
333.
The Leadership
Group comprised Iraqi politicians drawn from
identifiable
political
and regional groups and had been established by Gen Garner after
his arrival
in Baghdad.
It included both former exiles who had returned to Iraq after the
fall of
Saddam, and
those who had remained in Iraq.206
On 12 May,
Ms Short resigned from the Government. In her letter of resignation
to Mr Blair
she said
that she thought the run-up to the conflict had been mishandled,
but had agreed
to stay to
support the reconstruction effort.207
However:
“… the
assurances you gave me about the need for a UN mandate to establish
a
legitimate
Iraqi government have been breached. The Security Council
resolution
that you
and Jack have so secretly negotiated contradicts the assurances I
have
given in
the House of Commons and elsewhere about the legal authority of
the
Occupying
Powers, and the need for a UN-led process to establish a legitimate
Iraqi
government.
This makes my position impossible.”
Mr Blair
responded, thanking Ms Short for her valuable work and rebutting
her accusation
regarding
the resolution:
“We are in
the process of negotiating the UN resolution at the moment. And
the
agreement
on this resolution with our American and Spanish partners has
scarcely
been a
secret. As for who should lead the process of reconstruction, I
have always
204
Telegram 2
Baghdad to FCO London, 11 May 2003, ‘Iraq: What’s Going
Wrong?’
205
Telegram 3
IraqRep to FCO London, 12 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
206
The
membership of the ‘Leadership Group’ in early May 2003 included Mr
Masood Barzani (Kurdistan
Democratic
Party); Dr Jalal Talabani, (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan); Dr Ahmed
Chalabi (Iraqi National
Congress);
Abdel Aziz al Hakim (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq); Dr Ayad Allawi
(Iraqi
National Accord); Dr Ibrahim al Jaafari (Dawa Party) and Dr Adnan
Pachachi (Iraqi Independent
Democrats).
207
Short
C. An
Honourable Deception: New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of
Power. The Free
Press, 2004.
187