12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

• On the FPS, the “manpower ceiling” of 73,992 had been achieved.

• The Ministry of Justice had come under full Iraqi control on 30 May. The Higher

Judicial Council had been established in Baghdad and was processing up to

3,000 cases a week. The courts were functioning “reasonably well”.

• The Iraqi Correctional Service employed 3,269 officers and was operating

18 prison facilities, with a capacity of 5,500.

• The ICDC had 32,484 personnel, against a target of 40,680. Specialist

training had been hampered by a lack of equipment, such as communications

equipment.

• The Iraqi Armed Forces had originally been established for external security

only. Four battalions had been trained for the Army, with additional personnel

in the Air Force and Coastal Defence Force.

414.  On resourcing, Maj Gen Houghton commented:

“The SSR process to date has been stifled by bureaucratic rules of the release of

funds. If we are to be serious about sustaining the process of Iraqiisation of the

Security Sector we need to take a pragmatic and flexible approach to the allocation

of a combined UK source of some £37 million.”

415.  Mr Blair held a meeting on 3 June at which a paper from the MOD was

discussed.351 It is not clear from the record which MOD paper was considered.

Mr Blair agreed that a UK team should deploy to Iraq to act “in effect as the embryonic

secretariat of the MCNS [Ministerial Committee for National Security, described later in

this Section] and draft the equivalent of a white paper352 on defence and security”.

416.  Mr Blair asked to be informed of “any obstacles or log jams” which he might need

to raise with President Bush and commissioned a round‑up on Iraqiisation every two

weeks. Increased mentoring was not mentioned in the record of the discussion.

417.  Mr Blair also commissioned an update “illustrating what is actually happening in

MND(SE) in terms of handing over responsibility for security to the Iraqis”. The response

from the MOD is discussed later in this Section.

418.  Two weeks later Mr Blair again discussed Iraqiisation and again requested to be

informed of any issues automatically rather than having to ask.353

351  Letter Rycroft to Baker, 3 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 3 June’.

352 A ‘white paper’ is an authoritative report that informs readers concisely about a complex issue and sets

out proposals for future action.

353  Letter Rycroft to Baker, 15 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s meeting, 15 June’.

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