The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Op
SALAMANCA will, through decisive action, demonstrate that MNF is
improving
the lot of
Basrawis. Preliminary operations in Maysan and reinforcement of the
TRB
[Theatre
Reserve Battalion] have allowed me to concentrate my force so that
I will
be able to
lock down the City, district by district, to achieve security. This
will also
enable me
to surge in quick, high impact CMO [Civil Military Operations]
projects
that will
visibly improve quality of life … Meanwhile a concerted and
sustained effort
by Police
Training Teams will turn those police stations capable of
improvement
into police
stations that are capable of providing basic security in their
local areas.
My aim is
to cull the unredeemable and rehabilitate the ‘just about’
salvageable.
Employment
projects will provide jobs for a significant portion of the
population
giving them
an alternative to joining the militia.”
176.
Maj Gen
Shirreff commented that he would have preferred not to begin
Op
SALAMANCA
before Ramadan but had taken advice from local clerics and from
the
MNF command
in Baghdad, neither of whom considered this was a problem.
He
observed
that he was “also mindful that the Theatre Reserve is available for
a limited
period of
time and long‑term pressures are likely to lead to a reduction in
the forces
in Iraq”.
177.
Maj Gen
Shirreff concluded that:
“In short I
do not have the luxury of being able to wait for perfect
timing.
“We should
not, under any circumstances, assume that Op SALAMANCA will be
risk
free. We
must be prepared to fight if necessary, with all the grim
consequences we
are sadly
familiar with …
“To
summarise, if UK is to achieve mission success in SE Iraq, we must
have the
resolve to
see Op SALAMANCA through to its conclusion, as, of course, must
Iraqi
politicians.”
178.
Maj Gen
Shirreff also reported that “Dhi Qar is looking good for PIC” and
that
“morale
here is hugely boosted by the Australian decision to take on
overwatch in
Dhi Qar
after the Italian redeployment. Good on all who made it
possible!”114
179.
On 20
September, the JIC assessed the capabilities and intentions of Al
Qaida.115
The JIC
confirmed its judgement that the UK remained Al Qaida’s second
priority target
after the
US:
“The
conflict in Iraq has increased the threat from international
terrorism. It is a key
motivator
for Islamist extremists around the world, reinforcing the
determination of
terrorists
who were already committed to attacking the West, and motivating
others
who were
not …
114
Minute
Shirreff, 15 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) Southern Iraq Update – 15
September 2006’.
115
JIC
Assessment, 20 September 2006, ‘Al Qaida: Capabilities and
Intentions’.
36