9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
CERPS
[Commanders’ Emergency Response Programme]) in encouraging
political
engagement”.
582.
On 8 November,
the JIC issued an Assessment of Iranian objectives in
Iraq.271
It judged:
“Supreme
Leader Khamenei controls Iranian policy towards Iraq …
“Khamenei
sees violent resistance to the coalition presence in Iraq as a way
to
deter and
deflect US military action against Iran itself … He is prepared to
accept
an extended
period of disorder in Iraq and continued US military deployment as
the
price for
this. But Iran will not accept a permanent US military presence in
Iraq.
“IRGC-QF
will continue trying to calibrate violence by its proxies to keep
US forces
off balance
without provoking retaliation against Iran. Should MNF-I appear to
be
achieving a
stable Iraq – with the possibility of secure basing for US forces
into the
future –
Iran would probably seek to respond with increased proxy attacks
even at
the risk of
delaying US military drawdown.
“Iran’s
main aim in Basra and its environs is to keep intra-Shia violence
under
control.
Iran will keep pressure on UK forces there through its proxies,
while trying to
avoid
provoking US intervention.”
583.
Mr Brown
met the Chiefs of Staff, Mr Browne and Sir Bill Jeffrey,
MOD Permanent
Under
Secretary, on 8 November.272
They
discussed Iraq briefly, and Mr Brown agreed
that there
was a need to reach out to potential allies in the South, to
maintain the pace
of economic
redevelopment and to hold Prime Minister Maliki to the target date
of
17 December
for transition to PIC in Basra.
584.
Lt Gen Wall
told the Chiefs of Staff on 13 November that:
“… the MOU
[Memorandum of Understanding] for PIC had still to be finalised and
it
remained
unclear whether Prime Minister Maliki would agree to full PIC or
whether
an interim
solution would be pursued … on account of his reservations with
regard
to Gov
Waili’s ability to deal effectively with security.”273
585.
Government
officials working closely with the military met JAM1 and his
lawyer
separately
on 8 and 7 November respectively.274
The lawyer
pressed for rapid release
of JAM1,
although JAM1 did not. Maj Gen Binns was considering whether it
should be
linked to
the transfer to PIC and the officials commented that they could
“see some merit
in this, if
we can achieve satisfactory progress on the undertakings for the
next stage”.
271
JIC
Assessment, 8 November 2007, ‘Iranian Objectives in
Iraq’.
272
Letter
Fletcher to Forber, 9 November 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Chiefs of Staff,
8 November’.
273
Minutes, 13
November 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
274
Email
government official working closely with the military, 10 November
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
Recent Meetings’.
291