4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
305.
The Butler
Report also drew attention to uncertainties underlying
the
judgements
in the Assessment on Iraq’s:
•
attempts to
procure aluminium tubes;
•
possession
of plague; and
•
chemical
weapons programme.
306.
The Butler
Report stated that the Assessment had been “careful in its
description”
of the
purpose of Iraq’s attempts to procure aluminium
tubes.137
307.
The Butler
Report explained that the seizure of aluminium tubes in Jordan in
2001
had not
deterred Iraq from its efforts, and “By November 2001, there was
intelligence
that their
requirement had increased to 100,000 tubes”. It had, however, been
“clear
from an
early date” that, “on the basis of the specifications of the tubes”
sought by Iraq,
“they would
have required substantial re-engineering to make them suitable for
gas
centrifuge
use, including reducing them in length, and machining metal off the
inside and
outside”.
That was “paradoxical” given the “very fine tolerances” specified
by Iraq.
308.
An alternative
explanation for the purpose of the tubes had been available
“from
the
outset”.138
Intelligence
reporting in summer 2001 mentioned their potential use
as
rocket
motor casings. One report recorded that Iraq had been seeking tubes
of the same
precise
specification from Switzerland “probably for the Iraqi Air Force”.
Other reports
“suggested
possible conventional military uses”.
309.
Commenting on
the inclusion of references to Iraq possibly possessing
plague,
the Butler
Report stated that they seemed to have been included in the list of
Iraq’s
biological
agents “mainly on the basis of reporting from a much earlier
period”.139
The
judgement
that Iraq could “possibly” produce plague within days “was stronger
than
was
justified by more recent intelligence”. A report issued in 1999 had
“noted that the
informant
was unaware of any Iraqi work on plague”. Comments on that report
had
“concluded
prudently: ‘We do not currently have any evidence that plague forms
part of
the Iraq BW
programme.’”
310.
The Butler
Report added that “although little new intelligence was received,
and
most of
that was historical or unconvincing, plague continued to be
mentioned in JIC
Assessments
up to March 2003”. It concluded that those Assessments “reflected
historic
evidence,
and intelligence of dubious reliability, reinforced by suspicion of
Iraq, rather
than
up-to-date evidence”.140
137
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs
535-537.
138
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
540.
139
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
554.
140
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs
564-565.
71