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12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
the number of required forces assessed to match Iraq’s security problems
increasing.1097
1164.  The Report said that nearly 500 officers and 2,000 non‑commissioned officers
from the former regime had been vetted successfully and had rejoined the Iraqi Army.
Those personnel had to undergo a three‑week “rejoining” course. Up to 1,500 former
officers and 13,000 former non‑commissioned officers were expected to re‑enter
the force.
1165.  Those additions brought the total ISF planned strength to over 550,000.
1166.  The DoD stated that analysis of future force structure requirement projects
at the end of 2007 suggested the following force sizes in 2010:
Iraqi Army – 261,000 to 268,000;
Iraqi Air Force – 5,000;
Iraqi Navy – 1,500;
Iraqi Special Forces – 4,000;
MOI Forces – 307,000 to 347,000;
Total: 601,000 to 646,000.
Multi‑National Security Transition Command –
Iraq reorganisation
On 1 January 2008, MNSTC‑I reorganised into the following directorates and teams:
Directorate of Defence Affairs, led by a US Air Force Brigadier. It incorporated
the IMOD and JHQ Transition Teams, CMATT (renamed as CArmyATT), the
Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT), and the Maritime Strategic
Transition Team (MaSTT).
Directorate of Internal Affairs, led by a US Army Major General.
Intelligence Transition Team, led by a DoD civilian intelligence professional.
Iraqi National Counter‑Terrorism Transition Team, led by a US Navy Rear
Admiral.
Functional Capabilities Directorate focusing on developing Iraqi capacity and
providing subject matter experts on force management, personnel acquisition
and management, material acquisition, resource management, sustainment,
training and development.1098
The UK continued to provide two one‑star military officers to MNSTC‑I, in addition to the
civilian team in the IMOD and the contractors in the MOI.
1097  Report to Congress, 14 December 2007, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.
1098  Report to Congress, 7 March 2008, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.
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