The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
99.
Mr Blair
decided that the UK should not expose the constraints it faced
to
Secretary
Rumsfeld.
100.
In advance of
a visit by Secretary Rumsfeld, Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair on 31
May
with an
update on the military contingency planning on
Iraq.49
101.
The minute was
also sent to Mr Brown, Mr Straw and Sir Richard
Wilson,
Cabinet Secretary.
102.
Mr Hoon
advised Mr Blair that the MOD had been taking forward
contingency
planning in
the absence of discussions with the US, but: “To make further
progress we
now need
greater clarity on US thinking.”
103.
Detailed work
showed that the UK would not be able significantly to
contribute
offensive
operations before the end of November 2002 because of the
constraints of
operations
in Afghanistan on air transport.
104.
Mr Hoon wrote
that the key message from the contingency planning
exercise
was that:
“… if we
wish to contribute meaningfully to any operation our Armed Forces
would
need plenty
of warning time … We are clear that, for the UK to have influence
on
detailed
planning, the US would require a significant contribution to any
large scale
operation.
Our own analysis indicates that this would have to be at division
level
for land
forces …”
105.
Mr Hoon also
stated that, to plan properly, the UK needed to know:
•
what
outcome the US was seeking;
•
when the US
might wish to take action; and
•
how long
the US saw itself remaining in Iraq.
Mr Hoon
added that the UK needed to clarify the policy basis and legal
justification
for any
action.
106.
Mr Hoon
identified that the UK faced a dilemma:
“On the one
hand, if we discuss the detail and timescales of a potential UK
military
contribution
to a US-led coalition, it could send a misleading signal that we
have
decided to
support a specific line of military action. (Such a signal could be
used
in
Washington by the supporters of military action to promote their
cause.) Equally
if we are
not clear with the US at this stage about our military constraints,
we face
the danger
of our not being able to bring anything meaningful to the table at
the
right time
and the consequent loss of influence that would bring. Finally it
could be
49
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 31 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.
22