The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

to this resolution and failure to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation

of, this resolution’.”310

747. Lord Goldsmith gave evidence to the Inquiry about the purpose of this

exchange of letters.

748. Lord Goldsmith told the Inquiry:

“… if this ever came to court … we would have to persuade a court of our

interpretation of 1441, but they would also say, ‘What’s the evidence that they [Iraq]

did actually fail?’, and I was saying, at that stage, there needs to be strong factual

evidence of failure.”311

749. Lord Goldsmith described a briefing from Mr John Scarlett focused on the question

of Iraqi compliance:

“… the clear intelligence, the clear advice I was being given by him was that

Saddam Hussein in Iraq had not complied with the resolution, not just that there

were specific elements of … serious non-co-operation, including, for example,

intimidation of potential interviewees …”312

750. Asked what his opinion was on the weight of the intelligence, Lord Goldsmith

replied:

“At the end of the day … like any lawyer who is dependent upon the facts from his

client - I was dependent upon the assessment by the Government which had all

the resources it had … and that was why I particularly wanted to be sure … the

week before the events, that the Prime Minister, who did have access to all that

information, was of the view that there had been a failure.”313

751. Lord Goldsmith stated that the UK Government did not have to decide whether

there had been a material breach, because:

“… the pre-determination had been made [by the Security Council in resolution

1441] that if there was a failure, it would be a material breach … we had to decide

whether there was a failure but, if there was a failure, then the Security Council’s

pre-determination would come in and clothe that with the character of material

breach.”314

752. Addressing the purpose of seeking Mr Blair’s views, Lord Goldsmith stated:

“First of all, because it did depend upon the failure, it was important to point out

you need to be satisfied about that and secondly, I wanted the Prime Minister,

310 Letter Rycroft to Brummell, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq’.

311 Public hearing, 27 January 2010, pages 162-163.

312 Public hearing, 27 January 2010, page 163.

313 Public hearing, 27 January 2010, page 164.

314 Public hearing, 27 January 2010, page 167.

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