9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
740.
In its paper,
the IPU judged that there were “no quick fixes on offer” and
that
“the experience
of the last four years argues against a ‘grand bargain’
approach”.408
Mr Blair
annotated this paragraph “Why? The incremental approach has hardly
worked.”
741.
IPU diagnosed
the main obstacle to progress as:
“Iraq has
no tradition of power sharing or properly representative Government
…
It can
only work if the leaders of all Iraq’s main communities believe
that it is in their
best
interests wholeheartedly to engage in it. That is not yet the
case.”
742.
In the future,
IPU recommended that the UK should pursue a more
strategic
approach to
the process of reconciliation, through support to Prime Minister
Maliki’s
Office and
MNF‑I’s Joint Reconciliation and Support Cell. Prime Minister
Maliki should
be
persuaded to change his manner of governing and to make early
progress on some
of the key
issues (de‑Ba’athification, Hydrocarbons legislation and amendments
to the
Constitution).
Violence should be reduced and Iraq’s neighbours should be
persuaded
to be
more supportive.
743.
On the IPU
paper, Mr Blair commented:
“I’m afraid
I don’t find this at all persuasive. It is essentially the same
strategy but
trying
harder. It won’t work. The US/UK are consistently underestimating
their ability
to insist.
Maliki & Iraq must be made to go down the reconciliation path
with vigour.
Encouraging
it hasn’t worked. It has to be forced.”
744.
The MOD paper
summarised current activity on reconciliation by a small
team
led by Lt
Gen Lamb in Baghdad and said that “senior commanders and others
have
identified
a fleeting opportunity that has the potential to deliver a
significant campaign
advantage”.409
The MNF‑I
Engagement and Reconciliation effort was focused on
drawing
into the
political process those insurgent groups that MNF and the Iraqi
Government
assessed as
“potentially reconcilable” and was considered to be a “core output”
of the
military
campaign.
“The
‘Sunni’ initiative has established and developed discreet dialogue
with the key
Islamic
religious leadership of two of the major insurgent groups … The
emerging
leadership
… is now, we believe, likely to open dialogue with the Iraqi
Government
and MNF‑I,
engage in the political process and, subject to these
discussions,
follow up
with a series of confidence building measures. These range from
fighting
Al Qaida
(AQ) as part of a Government authorised force and the signing of
a
ceasefire
agreement with coalition and Iraqi security forces and to public
statements
exposing
the true nature of the AQ threat to Iraq. This initiative has
created tensions
408
Paper IPU,
20 April 2007, ‘Iraq: Reconciliation: Forward Plan’ including
manuscript comment Blair.
409
Letter
Beadle to Banner, 20 April 2007, ‘Iraq: Engagement and
Reconciliation in Iraq’ attaching
‘Engagement
and Reconciliation in Iraq’.
139