11.2 |
Conclusions: De‑Ba’athification
6.
The UK did
have advance sight of the text of the Freedom Message,
which
“disestablished”
the Ba’ath Party, but did not succeed in having its drafting
changed
to reflect
concerns raised by lawyers in the FCO.
7.
In the
post‑conflict phase, Secretary Rumsfeld and the Department of
Defense
in Washington,
and Ambassador Bremer in Baghdad, became the driving forces
of
de‑Ba’athification
policy.
8.
The UK’s
absence from formal decision‑making within the CPA (see Section
9.8)
meant that
its input to discussion of de‑Ba’athification policy in May 2003
was dependent
on the
influence of one particular individual: Mr John Sawers, the
Prime Minister’s
Special
Representative to Iraq. The key policy choice at that point was
centred on
whether the
top three, or the top four, tiers of the Ba’ath Party should be
brought
into scope.
9.
The CPA Order
No.1 signed by Ambassador Bremer differed from the UK
policy
position on
the best approach to de‑Ba’athification. In particular, the
decision to bring
the fourth
tier1
of Ba’ath
Party members into scope – which increased the number
of
individuals
potentially affected from around 5,000 to around 30,000 – was
considered
by the UK
to be disproportionate and likely to deprive Iraqi institutions of
much‑needed
capacity.
10.
The Inquiry
agrees with the UK’s view, and considers that limiting
de‑Ba’athification
to the top
three tiers would have had the potential to be far less damaging to
Iraq’s
post‑invasion
recovery and political stability.
11.
As Order No.1
was being finalised, UK officials did not propose any attempt
at
Ministerial
level to influence the policy via Washington. The effect of such an
approach
may in any
case have been limited as significant policy choices appear to have
been
made before
Ambassador Bremer deployed to Iraq. Not unreasonably,
Mr Sawers
advised
against lobbying Washington in the face of a strong desire by the
Iraqi
Leadership
Group, comprised largely of Shia and Kurdish politicians, for a
stringent
approach to
de‑Ba’athification.
12.
However, the
UK’s informal acceptance of Order No.1 helped to set the tone for
its
relationship
with the CPA which persisted throughout the lifespan of the
organisation.
Informal
consultation with the UK, usually through Mr Sawers and
subsequently
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, became the norm.
13.
The Order had
consequences. It made the task of reconstructing Iraq more
difficult,
both by
reducing the pool of Iraqi administrators and by adding to the pool
of the
unemployed
and disaffected, which in turn fed insurgent activity.
1
Down to the
rank of Group Member.
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