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3.4  |  Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002
knowledge in the dictator’s mind that behind the diplomacy is the possibility of force
being used.
“… if we do not deal with the threat from this international outlaw and his barbaric
regime, it may not erupt and engulf us this month or next; perhaps not even this year
or the next. But it will at some point. And I do not want it on my conscience that we
knew the threat, saw it coming and did nothing.”
467.  Mr Blair concluded this section of his speech by asking people to “listen to the
case” he would “be developing over the coming weeks and to reflect on it”.
468.  In a broader call for action, including to “restart the Middle East Peace Process”
and for renewed efforts on international terrorism, Mr Blair stated:
“Internationalism is no longer a utopian cry of the left, it is practical statesmanship.”
469.  It is clear from a record of Mr Hoon’s discussions in Washington on 11 September
that officials in the US Administration were following what Mr Blair said in public closely:
one senior official had described the speech to the TUC as “spectacular”.147
The decision to recall Parliament
470.  Mr Blair asked for Parliament to be recalled to debate Iraq and the issue of
weapons of mass destruction.
471.  On 11 September, Mr Blair wrote to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and
to the Lord Chancellor, asking for Parliament to be recalled in the week beginning
23 September.148
472.  Mr Blair wrote that “Parliament must and will be at the heart of the national debate
on the issue of Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction”. He was seeking permission “to
recall Parliament for a one‑day debate on the Adjournment”, led by Mr Straw, following a
statement from himself. He added:
“By then, important discussions at the UN will have taken place. And the
Government will be in a position to publish the dossier on what we know of
the Iraqi regime and its WMD programme.”
473.  Mr Blair emphasised that “we are not yet at the stage of making decisions about
military commitments with regard to Iraq, and that should we be so in the future,
Parliament would obviously be given every opportunity to express its view”.
147 Telegram 1159 Washington to FCO, 11 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Mr Hoon’s Visit to Washington,
11 September’.
148 Letter Blair to Martin, 11 September 2002, [untitled].
173
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