9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
24.
Mr McDonald
explained that although the FCO saw some grounds for US
concern
that a
National Conference appointing an IIA would open the process up to
extremist
groups,
there was:
“… a risk
too that overt Coalition manipulation of the political process will
rob it of
legitimacy
and boost popular support for extremist groups … while attracting a
lot of
criticism
in the region and elsewhere”.
25.
The FCO
instead agreed with Mr Sawers that the Coalition could appoint
an
Advisory
Council to agree a list of prospective members of an IIA, which
would then be
formally
approved by the Coalition.
26.
Mr McDonald’s
letter said that the Advisory Council’s role would be
essentially
technocratic:
to work with the Coalition to ensure provision of basic services.
The other
tasks
(review of the Constitution, legal and economic reform) were a
central part of the
political
process, and should emerge from a credible process of consultation
with a
representative
body of Iraqis. A National Conference remained the best instrument
for
this. It
was essential that Mr Vieira de Mello be allowed to play a
full role, both to comply
with the
letter and the spirit of resolution 1483, and to counter
allegations that the post-
conflict
arrangements were a Coalition fix.
27.
Mr Blair
travelled to Iraq on 29 May to meet members of the UK Armed Forces
and
“thank them
for their part in the successful military campaign … and for their
continuing
work on
humanitarian and rehabilitation tasks”.9
28.
The MOD
briefed Mr Blair in advance of his visit that the “situation
in Iraq is
increasingly
safe and secure in the North, and permissive in the
South”.10
29.
Mr Blair’s
meeting with Ambassador Bremer during his visit to Basra is
described
in Section
10.1.
30.
Sir David
Manning gave an account of Mr Blair’s visit to Iraq to Dr
Condoleezza
Rice, US
National Security Advisor, and to Mr Andy Card, President
Bush’s Chief of
31.
Sir David
reported his own and Mr Blair’s views that there should be
someone in
the
White House, as well as someone in No.10, to whom Ambassador
Bremer could
turn when
he needed help:
“…
administering post-war Iraq through DOD [Department of Defense] was
the
wrong
profile and the wrong message … politically, it was vital that the
lead was
9
Letter
Watkins to Cannon, 27 May 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to
Iraq’.
10
Letter
Watkins to Cannon, 27 May 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Iraq’
attaching Brief [MOD], Prime
Minister’s
Visit to Iraq: 29 May 2003’.
11 Letter
Manning to McDonald, 1 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
211