10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
responsibility
for an ORHA regional office “unless the scoping study concludes
that this
252.
Mr Rycroft
also recorded Mr Blair’s view that:
“As a
general rule, our role in humanitarian aid and in the
reconstruction of Iraq
should be
commensurate with our contribution to the military
phase.”
253.
Mr Rycroft
advised that Mr Blair believed that the US$100m made
available
to DFID in
the 9 April Budget statement should be used to support ORHA,
including
funding secondees
to ORHA from other UK Government departments.
254.
Ms Short told
DFID officials that she had outlined the conclusions of
Mr Malik’s
report at
the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.149
DFID would
not be able to pay for ORHA’s
inefficiency.
Putting in large numbers of people might make the situation even
worse.
255.
Lt Gen Garner,
accompanied by Maj Gen Cross and other ORHA staff, left
Kuwait
to fly into
Baghdad on 21 April.150
256.
In response to
the decision at the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 17 April to
increase
and
formalise UK support for ORHA, Sir Michael Jay wrote to Sir Andrew
Turnbull on
22 April,
inviting all Permanent Secretaries urgently to set in hand
arrangements to
identify
volunteers for secondment to ORHA.151
257.
Sir Michael
attached an IPU list of initial priority areas for UK support to
ORHA’s
work on
strengthening Iraqi ministries, “based on advice from UK secondees
in ORHA”.
Priority
areas included:
•
priority
one (“must fill”): defence, SSR and intelligence; interior,
policing,
justice and
prisons; the Oil Ministry; all ministries relevant to
infrastructure;
central
banking;
•
priority
two (“should fill”): finance, foreign affairs, customs and health;
and
•
priority
three (“could fill”): education, culture, local government; and
labour and
social
affairs.
258.
In his letter,
Sir Michael described in broad terms the personal qualities and
skills
volunteers
should possess:
“The key to
a successful secondment will be enthusiasm, personal
impact,
resilience,
flexibility and the ability to take a wide top-down view of policy
and
148
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 17 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA’.
149
Minute PPS
[DFID] to Miller, 17 April 2003, ‘Iraq Cabinet Readout: 17
April’.
150
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing Office,
2009;
Statement Cross, 2009, page 20.
151
Letter Jay
to Turnbull, 22 April 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Support for the Office for
Reconstruction and
Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA)’ attaching Paper IPU, April 2003, ‘Provisional
Estimate of Priority Areas
for UK
Engagement in ORHA Assistance to Iraqi Ministries’.
49