The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
76.
Members of the
House of Commons Defence Select Committee visited Iraq
from
8 to 11
July, focusing particularly on the UK military role in Basra,
transition timing, the
consequences
of UK withdrawal and the readiness of the ISF.38
77.
Mr Asquith
reported that during a visit to Basra the Committee had asked
their
Basrawi
interlocutors about the current security situation in the city and
the likely
consequences
of a UK withdrawal within 12 months:
“The
Basrawis were clear: services and reconstruction were improving but
the
main
problem was that the ISF were under-funded, unqualified and
security was
deteriorating.
The British Government had promised a lot when it liberated
Iraq,
but had not
delivered. Militias were more of a concern than criminal gangs.
The
provincial
authorities were not able to confront the militias because the
security
forces owed
their loyalty to political parties rather than the State … Pulling
no
punches,
they said a British withdrawal would ‘be followed by chaos sweeping
the
province
like a hurricane’.”
78.
The Committee
asked Ambassador Crocker and Gen Petraeus about
whether
UK forces
had a continuing role in Basra. They both made clear that
conditions should
determine
the force numbers, not timelines. The continued presence of UK
forces was
necessary
for security stabilisation, capacity building with the ISF and to
allow the
political
situation with the Governor to be resolved. This should allow Basra
to make the
transition
to PIC by the end of the year and, as bases were closed or handed
over, UK
troop
numbers could fall. It was essential that Basra Palace was handed
over without it
becoming a
JAM Party HQ, to demonstrate that Basra was stable enough for
PIC.
79.
Mr Asquith
reported that Prime Minister Maliki had told the Committee that
Basra
would be
ready for PIC in August or September. He did not think that UK
military support
would be
required for much longer, and considered that there would be no
effect from
UK
withdrawal in 12 months.
80.
In advance of
the NSID(OD) meeting planned for 19 July, FCO and MOD
officials
produced a
joint paper setting out the latest “assessments and plans on
security
transition
and the associated re-posturing and drawdown of UK troops in
Basra”.39
81.
The paper had
been discussed, in draft, at the ISG on 9 July, which considered
that
there
should not be a large gap between leaving Basra Palace and moving
to PIC.40
82.
The paper set
out a series of key judgements:
“•
The
political process in Iraq is not currently delivering what is
needed to
generate
confidence that the country faces a sustainable
future;
38
eGram
30010/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 13 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Visit of House
of Commons Defence
Committee,
8-11 July’.
39
Paper FCO
and MOD, 12 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Transition in Basra’.
40
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 11 July 2007, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group, 9 July’.
198