9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
Security
Council authorisation to enforce Iraq’s WMD [weapons of mass
destruction]
and related
obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. The
longer
an
occupation continues, therefore, and the further the tasks
undertaken depart from
this
objective, the more difficult the Occupation would be to justify in
legal terms.”
36.
In a section
on the administration of Iraq during Occupation, Mr Llewellyn
explained
that
“limitations on the ability of the Occupying Power to change
existing governmental
and
administrative structures based in Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations, mean that
Security
Council authorisation will be needed for any such
reform”.
37.
In preparation
for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Camp David, Mr
Straw’s
Private
Office provided Mr Rycroft with a negotiating brief for a new UN
Security Council
resolution
written by the IPU.19
“Without a
UNSCR, other countries, international organisations, the IFIs,
UN
agencies
and NGOs [non-governmental organisations] will be comparatively
limited
in what
they can do … That would leave US/UK with no viable exit strategy
from Iraq
and a huge
bill.”
39.
The brief set
out the case for a resolution which included the following
key
principles,
on which the US and UK were agreed:
•
For the
first few weeks the Coalition, through ORHA, would be responsible
for
the
administration of Iraq.
•
The UN
should not be asked to run Iraq.
•
The
objective should be to get Security Council authorisation or
endorsement
for an
international presence that will include the UN.
•
For as long
as they were needed, Coalition troops would provide security
on
the ground.
•
As soon as
possible, Iraqis should begin to govern themselves, through
the
creation of
an IIA, under appropriate supervision.
40.
The brief also
identified the key issues on which there remained
differences
between the
US and UK:
•
The US
desire for a new UN resolution to endorse ORHA, which the UK
was
certain
would not obtain Security Council agreement.
•
The UK
belief that the Iraqis themselves, assisted by a UN
Special
Representative,
should establish the IIA, not the Coalition.
•
The role of
the IIA, which the UK believed needed to be independent of
the
Coalition/ORHA
and to have genuine executive authority.
19
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 25 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s visit to Washington:
Iraq: UN Security Council
Resolution
on Phase IV’ attaching Briefing IPU, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase
IV: Authorising UNSCR’.
137