The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

383. In a bilateral meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld on 21 May, Mr Hoon raised the

security situation in Baghdad and said:

“UK Armed Forces would be happy to help if needed, for example by providing

advisers: our experience in Sierra Leone – training a security forces essentially from

scratch – was highly relevant.”257

384. The following day, on 22 May, the Chiefs of Staff considered the issue of deploying

16 Air Assault Brigade further.258

385. Lieutenant General Sir Anthony Pigott, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff

(Commitments), who had visited Baghdad with Maj Gen Richards, reported that:

“… at best, the law and order situation was stable or slightly deteriorating, and the

key judgement was whether the UK could bridge the gap until the new US forces

arrived and were effective … His view was that [the proposal to deploy 16 Air Assault

Brigade] would provide the effects required.”

386. Mr Sawers explained to attendees that both Ambassador Bremer and General

John Abizaid, Commander US Central Command (CENTCOM), were “aware that the

Coalition was succeeding outside Baghdad, but was failing in the Capital”. They knew

what was required, but were “unable to deliver them with the force package currently to

hand and would welcome a demonstration of effect to initiate the necessary change”.

Mr Sawers was:

“… confident that the US would achieve the desired effect in due course. The key

issue was the immediate future and deterioration in the intervening period.”

387. Major General Robert Fry, the Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, reported to the

Chief of the Defence Staff that PJHQ was not certain, without a reconnaissance visit,

where the UK could achieve effect.259 PJHQ considered it was “likely, while 16 AA Bde

could provide two battle groups to Baghdad, that the enablers required would have to

be drawn from Basra with a consequent increased risk to success there”. He also noted

that 16 Air Assault Brigade would need external assistance in order to provide instruction

in policing.

388. The MOD Legal Adviser observed that “a number of difficult legal issues would

arise should UK forces deploy to a new area, Baghdad, under US command”. The

minutes concluded that:

257 Letter Watkins to Policy Director [MOD], 22 May 2003, ‘Bilateral with US Defense Secretary:

21 May 2003’.

258 Minutes, 21 May 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

259 Minute ACGS to CDS/PSO, 20 May 2003, ‘ACGS’ Trip to Iraq (17-21 May 03) – Initial Findings

and Recommendations’.

200