The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
167.
Both Houses of
Parliament were recalled from recess on 24 September
2002
to debate
the case for effective action in respect of the threat posed by
Iraq.
168.
When he sought
the recall of Parliament, Mr Blair wrote that: “Parliament
must
and will be
at the heart of the national debate on the issue of Iraq and
weapons of mass
destruction”;
and that he envisaged a statement from himself followed by “a
one‑day
debate on
the Adjournment”, led by Mr Straw.56
169.
The
dossier, Iraq’s Weapons
of Mass Destruction – The Assessment of the British
Government, was
published on 24 September 2002 (see Section 4.2).57
170.
The Foreword
to the dossier written by Mr Blair set out the Government’s
position
that “the
inspectors must be allowed back to do their job properly”. If
Saddam Hussein
refused or
“made it impossible for them to do their job” then “the
international community
will have
to act”.
171.
Mr Blair
stated that the dossier had been produced to explain
the
Government’s
concerns to the British people.
172.
The
accuracy of the information in the dossier and some of the
comments
made by
Mr Blair in its Foreword and in his statement to Parliament
are addressed
in Section
4.2.
173.
Mr Blair’s
statement to Parliament on the publication of the dossier
on
24 September
and the subsequent questions and answers lasted for 90
minutes.58
174.
Mr Blair
began by thanking the Speaker for recalling Parliament “to debate
the
best way to
deal with the issue of the present leadership of Iraq and weapons
of mass
destruction”
and described the dossier as “detailing the history of Iraq’s
weapons of
mass
destruction programme, its breach of United Nations resolutions and
its attempts
to rebuild
that illegal programme”.
175.
Addressing the
problems encountered by the inspectors, Mr Blair placed the
issues
being
addressed firmly in the context of:
“… an
11‑year history … of UN will flouted, of lies told by Saddam about
the
existence
of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and of
obstruction,
defiance
and denial.
56
Letter
Blair to Martin, 11 September 2002, [untitled].
57
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002.
58
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, columns 1‑23.
228