The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

136. In SIS1’s view, Iran did not have a strong interest in a stable Middle East and had

been willing to provide support to the insurgents, both Shia and Sunni, because “if they

could cause trouble for the coalition, they would”.64

137. On 16 September, Mr Blair chaired a meeting of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on

Iraq, called “to ensure the UK government approach to Iraq was fully co-ordinated in the

period up to Iraqi elections in January 2005”.65 He intended that the Group should meet

regularly.

138. Mr Blair’s Chairman’s Brief stated that one purpose of the meeting was to:

“… galvanise the key departments and ensure they give Iraq their full attention

in the next five months, in order to achieve the necessary results on the ground

in the run-up to elections.” 66

139. Given an insurgency that appeared to be increasingly co-ordinated, Mr Blair told

the Group that he was “concerned that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) did not have

sufficient capability to take on the insurgents”.67

140. General Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff, reported that plans were in

place for the ISF to be fully equipped and trained by mid-2005, but that their capabilities

would remain limited, especially compared to the MNF-I. There was little scope for

accelerating the plans.

141. In discussion, members of the Group observed that the insurgency in the Sunni

triangle was the most serious security threat facing Iraq and that the UK needed a better

understanding of the US/Iraqi campaign plan to tackle it.

142. The Group agreed that the MOD, DFID and the FCO would produce specific

suggestions for how progress could be made in Iraq which Mr Blair could put to

President Bush when they next spoke:

“• MOD to make recommendations on how ISF capacity will develop and what

more we can do to accelerate or refine the delivery to allow the ISF to tackle the

current insurgency campaign.

• DFID to advise on where blockages can removed [sic] to speed up the impact of

reconstruction funding.

• FCO to advise on what political strategy Allawi should be pursuing and his

capacity to deliver it.”

64 Private hearing, 2010, pages 87-89.

65 Minutes, 16 September 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq meeting.

66 Briefing Cabinet Office, 16 September 2004, ‘Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq meeting to be held in the

Cabinet Room on Thursday 16 September 2004 at 0830: Chairman’s Brief’.

67 Minutes, 16 September 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq meeting.

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