The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
130.
Mr Campbell
added that Mr Blair “said he felt Iraq would come up with
some
surprise to
split the international community, that intelligence showed he
would regard
giving up
WMD as a total humiliation, and it was essential to his internal
grip”.
131.
Mr Campbell
commented that Dr Blix “was a lot less bullish than last time
and
clearly fed
up with the feeling he was being bullied by America”.
132.
In his
subsequent meeting with Mr Straw, Dr Blix was reported to
have told
Mr Straw
that his next report to the Security Council might include what the
Iraqis
had not yet
proved they did not have, rather than much evidence of what
UNMOVIC
133.
Dr Blix
had clear indications that anthrax had been weaponised and his
personal
judgement
was that Iraq did have programmes and definitely possessed the
ability
to jump-start
BW programmes. The trick would be to find evidence.
134.
Dr Blix
also told Mr Straw that if the Al Samoud missiles were found
to be illegal,
they would
be destroyed. That could force a real confrontation with the Iraqis
who were
not keen to
lose billions of dollars of armaments at a time when they were
threatened
with
military action.
135.
Dr ElBaradei
was reported to have told Mr Straw that he would press Iraq
hard on
possible
uranium imports and interviews. He did not expect much movement
from Iraq
and tough
messages from the international community could only help the
inspectors.
136.
When
Dr ElBaradei raised the possibility of building an option for
exile into the
second
resolution, Mr Straw responded that Saddam Hussein would
“choose exile
(if at all)
only if he was convinced that was his only chance of survival”.
Mr Straw did
not favour
including it in a second resolution. If a strong resolution was
passed, there
would be
“enough time [for Saddam Hussein] to consider his options” and for
“high level
envoys to
help him make the right choice”.
137.
Mr Straw
encouraged Dr ElBaradei to focus on interviews; the UK had
portable
“safe
rooms” and could provide them to the IAEA and UNMOVIC if it
helped.
Dr ElBaradei
reported that the scientists he had interviewed were clearly
extremely
nervous,
but he saw great difficulties with conducting interviews
overseas.
138.
The record of
the discussion with Mr Blair reported that Dr ElBaradei
thought
opinion was
moving towards a second resolution.34
33
Telegram 79
FCO to UKMIS New York, 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Meetings with Blix
and
El-Baradei, 6 February’.
34
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meetings
with Blix and El-Baradei,
6 February’.
202