6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
clearance
vessels and air‑to‑air refuellers for their carrier‑based
aircraft”. While
no
conventional land forces could meet the timescales for the
deployment of
maritime
and air forces “Special Forces could be deployed very rapidly to
match
US
timescales and priorities. This is likely to be very attractive to
US planners,
and their
contribution to success would be significant.”
•
Package
3: a
“discrete UK package” based on deployment of an
armoured
division
which the MOD envisaged would be used in northern Iraq, in
addition
to the
forces in Package 2. The MOD stated that a force that was
“credible”
would be
required: “Even to create uncertainty in the mind of Saddam”, and
the
contribution
of a division “would probably require command and control at
Corps
level. The
UK might consider providing an armoured division either as part of
a
US‑led
Corps or as part of a larger coalition force possibly led by the UK
using
the
framework of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
[ARRC].”199
“… it would
take six
months for the
whole division to be in place and then with such
limited
sustainment and reach that it would be unsuitable for a deliberate
attack on
large-scale
Iraqi forces. An optimum capability for a sustained campaign inside
Iraq
could take
about […] to achieve”.
474.
The MOD also
stated that the “deployment of a light brigade with an air
mobile
capability”
was “an additional possibility”. That:
“… would
have the task of securing the deployment area in Turkey ahead of
the
arrival of
the full division and preparing for operations short of armoured
war fighting.
These could
involve a role in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone if it were subject to
the
threat of
an Iraqi attack and/or post‑conflict operations following the
defeat of Iraqi
forces. The
actual deployment of forces, even their preparation, should have
an
impact on
the Iraqi regime and prevent its single‑focus attention on the US
forces
in the
South.”
475.
The MOD
highlighted problems with:
•
the concept
of a “Running Start”;
•
the
fragility of the logistic chains; and
•
vulnerability
to chemical or biological weapons.
476.
The MOD stated
that “thinking about dealing with the aftermath of a
successful
attack
remains sketchy”.
477.
Finally, the
MOD drew attention to the funding which would be required once
a
decision in
principle was made to participate in military
activity.
199
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
247