3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
world
better than that”; and the UK was “still on the line of an
ultimatum with an absurdly
short
deadline”. France’s position had been “consistent and coherent
throughout”, and it
had
“warned” the UK “not to underestimate” its “determination to carry
this position to its
logical
conclusion”.
453.
Sir John
stated that he “respected the French right to have a different
position, but
there had
been no need to go as far as a veto, and a deliberate move to
declare it in
advance to
try to influence others against our ideas”. He added
that:
“France
seemed to be forgetting what was in 1441 – Saddam had to make
an
immediate
and accurate declaration and co-operate fully and immediately … or
face
the
consequences. He had done neither of these things. We could not
simply let
things
drift.”
454.
Mr Gourdault-Montagne
replied that “the inspectors had made clear that the
process was
working, even if co-operation was not total. In these
circumstances, it was
not right
to rush to war.” He repeated “in a spirit of friendship” that what
the UK was
doing “was
against what the French had … thought was agreed between us. The
French
had been
very careful to avoid any such thing …”
455.
Sir John
concluded that Mr Gourdault-Montagne “should appreciate the
extent
to which
France had pushed her position against her closest allies was hard
to
understand”.
The UK “had offered to try to find common ground several times but
to
no avail”.
456.
Sir John also
recorded that he had been told by the US Ambassador to
France
that “he
had seen Mr de Villepin the previous evening to enquire what
lay behind
the
President’s words on the veto”. Mr de Villepin “had claimed US
and French
positions
were really quite close, but the problem was the lack of
flexibility in the US
stance”.
The Ambassador had advised him to speak to Secretary Powell
and they had
subsequently
“spoken at length” but their “positions were too far apart … on
timescale
and
automaticity” to reach agreement: “Like us, the Americans judged
that Chirac was
not really
looking for a way out.”
457.
Sir John
commented that it was:
“Predictable
that the French would react in this way. There is a clear danger of
an
upward
spiral of polemics which could make working together afterwards
harder.
But our
position can hardly surprise the French, nor the fact that we are
using
Chirac’s
words against him when the stakes are so high – he did say them,
even
if he
may not have meant to express quite what we have chosen to
interpret.”
458.
Mr de
Villepin told Mr Straw that France was willing to look at an
ultimatum
as long as
the Security Council was responsible for the final decision on
action.
459.
Mr Straw
responded that France had made life very difficult for the
UK.
479