15.1 | Civilian
personnel
quite
aggressive with them about why it was they wanted to put themselves
at risk to
do
something that many people considered to be something which was a
mistake.” 382
580.
Mr Tim
Foy, Head of DFID Iraq from August 2005 to August 2006, told the
Inquiry:
“Generally
speaking, I think we did reasonably well in terms of acquiring core
staff
from DFID,
certainly in the early years. I think it’s got progressively harder
as the
engagement
has progressed because the lustre of going has gone
there.” 383
581.
The
recruitment of UK police officers for deployment to Iraq faced
additional
obstacles.
582.
CC Kernaghan,
holder of the International Affairs portfolio for the Association
of
Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) from 2001 to 2008, told the Inquiry that the
impact of a
posting to
Iraq on police officers’ careers had been a significant obstacle to
effective
recruitment
and deployment. He had considered it his responsibility to point
out to
potential
recruits that Iraq might not be a good career move.384
583.
CC Kernaghan
added that the police experience had not been entirely
negative.
After a
while, the positive testimonies of returning officers had started
to encourage
potential
recruits: “I actually found it marginally easier to deploy people.
They were not
affected by
the big picture.”
584.
Former Chief
Superintendent Dick Barton, UK Chief Police Adviser in Iraq
from
2006 to
2007, told the Inquiry that “it was made quite clear to me that
there were no
guarantees
regarding postings or jobs on my return”.385
585.
The resource
cost to the contributing police force was also a
constraint
on
recruitment. ACC Smith told the Inquiry: “Some forces, particularly
the larger
metropolitan,
refused to allow serving officers to deploy.” 386
586.
Government
departments took a number of steps to encourage staff to
volunteer
for Iraq,
including:
•
financial
allowances;
•
decompression
breaks;
•
assistance
with post‑Iraq job placements; and
•
temporary
promotion.
587.
Incentives to
attract UK volunteers were not introduced uniformly
across
government.
Differences in the terms and conditions applied by different
organisations
persisted
throughout the Iraq campaign.
382
Private
hearing, 22 June 2010, page 79.
383
Private
hearing, 22 June 2010, page 67.
384
Public
hearing, 23 July 2010, page 68.
385
Statement,
7 June 2010, page 2.
386
Statement,
25 June 2010, page 11.
347