13.1 |
Resources
84.
Mr Watkins
wrote to Sir David Manning on 20 September, advising that two
issues
needed to
be addressed quickly:
•
what
potential UK force contribution should be presented to the
forthcoming US
Central
Command (CENTCOM) planning conference the following week;
and
•
whether to
replace army units already allocated to Operation
FRESCO67
so
that
they would
be available if a land force contribution was
approved.68
85.
Mr Watkins
advised that Mr Hoon believed that Package 2 (the air and
maritime
package,
plus Special Forces) should be presented to the conference as a
potential
UK contribution.
86.
Providing a
land contribution in addition to Package 2 was “more
complicated”.
The option
required further development.
87.
Mr Watkins
wrote that Mr Hoon felt it would be “premature” to offer a
land
contribution
on the same basis as Package 2:
“… we
should indicate to CENTCOM that we are still considering this
option and that
they should
model two plans in parallel, one including the UK land force
contribution
and one
without it.”
88.
Mr Blair
discussed the contribution that might be offered to the US with
Mr Hoon on
23
September (see Section 6.1). Mr Blair agreed with Mr Hoon
that Package 2 could be
offered as
a potential UK contribution but there was a misunderstanding over
whether
the US
should be informed that the UK was still considering a land option
(Package 3).
89.
Following the
meeting, Mr Watkins informed officials in the MOD
that:
“The Prime
Minister is content for us to proceed broadly as set out in my
letter
of 20
September. The Prime Minister remains very cautious about the
viability
of
Package 3, not least because of its implications for our
ability to meet other
contingencies
and the significant cost premium entailed.”69
90.
In his
diaries, Mr Campbell described a meeting between Mr Brown
and Mr Blair
on 23
September.70
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair had reported that Mr Brown
“was
basically
just saying we could not afford a military conflict and making
clear he had to
be
consulted on every piece of spending”. Mr Campbell also
described the very difficult
relationship
between Mr Blair and Mr Brown at this time.
67
Op FRESCO
was the provision of emergency cover by the Armed Forces in the
event of industrial action
by civilian
firefighters.
68
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contribution to any Military Action’.
69
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 23 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
the Prime Minister:
23 September’.
70
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries.
Volume 4.
The Burden of Power: Countdown to
Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
459