The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
563.
At the
beginning of December, UK officials learned from their US
counterparts that
Dr Kay was
considering not returning to Iraq after his visit to the US in the
second week
564.
Mr Scarlett
told Sir Nigel Sheinwald that the reasons were not clear, but Dr
Kay
was
reported to have objected strongly to the transfer of some of the
ISG’s resources
from WMD to
work on the security situation and to be concerned about the
difficulty and
danger of
ISG activity in Iraq.
565.
On
5 December, Mr Scarlett reported that Sir Richard
Dearlove had been told that
Dr Kay’s
departure was not certain and that, if he did go, there would be “a
heavyweight
replacement”.311
Sir Richard
had also received confirmation that there would be no
reduction
in resources devoted to the ISG’s WMD work and the job would be
done
thoroughly.
566.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald commented to Mr Blair on
8 December:
“… it now
seems that Kay has to be persuaded to stay on. It seems unlikely
that he’ll
stay, as
planned, until next summer.”312
567.
Mr Howard
discussed the ISG with Mr John McLaughlin, Deputy Director
for
Central
Intelligence, in Washington on 11 December.313
Mr Howard
said that he was
“scouring
the barrel” to meet a request from Mr McLaughlin to find more
people for
the ISG.
The UK would be able to supply an additional four former UN
inspectors
with BW
expertise and was looking to see if it could provide more good
analysts. The
principal
UK BW experts could not be spared full-time, but could continue to
deploy to
the ISG in
short bursts. Mr Howard suggested that better use could be
made of the UK
mobile laboratory.
568.
Mr Howard
also reiterated that the UK would need “full consultation on
timing,
content and
presentation of any interim report”.
569.
On
15 December, Mr Cannon sent Mr Blair a list of “key
points” from the ISG
Interim
Report for use at PMQs.314
It largely
repeated the draft core script sent out by
Mr Rycroft
on 2 October. The key additions, taken from the Interim
Report, were:
•
“Two
key former BW scientists confirmed that Iraq under the guise of
legitimate
activity
developed refinements of processes and products relevant to
BW
agents. The
scientists discussed the development of improved,
simplified
fermentation
and spray drying capabilities for the stimulant Bt [Bacillus
310
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 3 December 2003, ‘David
Kay’.
311
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 5 December 2003, ‘David
Kay’.
312
Manuscript
comment Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 8 December 2003 on Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald,
5 December
2003, ‘David Kay’.
313
Telegram
JICTEL 122 Washington to JIC London, 12 December 2003, ‘ISG
and UK/US intelligence
co‑operation
in Iraq’.
314
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 15 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Key Points
from the ISG Report’.
536