3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
to assert
its will firmly and to back it by the threat of force, which is the
only thing
that will
work.”
•
“If we
cannot get the UN resolution – I believe that we can – we have to
find
a way
of dealing with this.”
•
“We should
make sure … that the United States and the international
community
are working
to the same agenda, and I believe they are … I believe …
very
strongly;
it is an article of faith with me – the American relationship and
our
ability to
partner America in these difficult issues is of fundamental
importance,
not just to
this country but to the wider world. Those people who want to
pull
apart the
transatlantic relationship … or who can sneer about the
American
relationship
that we have, may get some short‑term benefit, but, long‑term,
that
is very
dangerous to this country.”
•
“… the
point is that if we know that someone has weapons of mass
destruction,
if they
have used them before and if, as a result, the international
community
has said
they must be disarmed of those weapons, surely the greatest
risk
is letting
them carry on developing those weapons and not doing
anything
about it.”
•
“… in the
past four or five years the issue of Iraq, weapons inspections and
what
to do about
that regime has come over my desk pretty much week after week
…
[I]t has
been there as an issue the whole time … What we know now from
the
assessment
given by our Joint Intelligence Committee is that the very thing
that
we feared
is the very thing that the Iraqi regime is working
on.”
•
“… the
purpose of any action should be the disarmament of Iraq. Whether
that
involves
regime change is in a sense a question for Saddam …”
•
“What has
happened … is that, whether we like it or not, now is the
point
of decision
…”
•
“We have to
be clear that the consequences of saying now to Iraq that we
are
not going
to do anything will be really, really serious.”
•
“… we have
to make the decision, and I do not think we can duck
the
consequences
of that decision.”
201.
Mr Blair
did not directly respond to a question from Sir Brian
Mawhinney
(Conservative)
about how long he was prepared to allow the UN to reassert its
authority
before
looking for alternative strategies.
202.
Mr Blair
concluded that the threat was not that Saddam Hussein was
going
to launch
an attack on the UK “tomorrow”:
“… the
threat is that within his own region, or outside it given the
missile capability
that he is
trying to develop, he launches an attack that threatens the
stability of that
region and
then the wider world. All the evidence that we have is that if
there is such
a conflict
in that region, we will not be able to stand apart from
it.”
235