The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
provided
points which had been passed to Russia, France and China on how
the
comprehensive
review should be conducted.
617.
In a press
statement on 15 November, the President of the Security
Council noted
Mr Aziz
and the Iraqi Permanent Representative had informed the Council
that:
•
“Iraq has
decided, clearly and unconditionally, to co-operate fully with
the
Special
Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)”.
•
The
decision constituted “a rescinding of the decisions of
5 August and
31 October,
and that Iraq’s co-operation with the Special Commission
and
the IAEA
will allow the return of inspectors to resume all their activities
on an
immediate,
unconditional and unrestricted basis, in accordance
with
the relevant
resolutions and with the Memorandum of Understanding
of
618.
The press
statement also said that “Taking note of past experience”,
Council
members had
“underlined that their confidence in Iraq’s intentions” needed to
be
“established
by unconditional and sustained co-operation”, and:
“…
reaffirmed their readiness to proceed with a comprehensive review,
once
the
Secretary-General has confirmed, on the basis of reports from the
Special
Commission
and the IAEA, that Iraq has returned to full co-operation, on the
basis
of
resolution 1194 (1998) and the Council President’s letter of
30 October to the
Secretary-General.”
619.
The US and the
UK had already authorised air strikes when Mr Aziz’s
letter
was received.
620.
Mr Blair
wrote that air strikes had been due to begin at 4.30pm on
14 November,
but
President Clinton “had decided to pause” when Iraq’s letter was
received. Mr Blair
described
Iraq’s response as “full of holes, typical Saddam rubbish”, but
early on
15 November
action was suspended.252
621.
Mr Blair
wrote that Mr Cook was relieved, but he had been “determined
to keep
the US
alliance intact and functioning at what was a crucial
moment”.
622.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair understood why President Clinton had
decided
to pause,
“but our general view was that we should have gone
ahead”.253
He
wrote:
“TB was
worried we would end up diluting the support we had. Clear breach
would get
us support.
If we were signalling we weren’t sure, or it didn’t matter, we
would dissipate
it.”
Mr Blair and President Clinton spoke eight times over an
18-hour period.
251
UN Press
Release, 15 November 1998, ‘Security Council notes agreement
of Iraq to rescind earlier
decisions,
allow resumption of UNSCOM and IAEA activities’ (SC/6596
IK/258).
252
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
253
Campbell A
& Stott R. The Blair
Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries.
Hutchinson, 2007.
140