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5  |  Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003
receive this request for advice and that finally came at some stage in December.
Until that had arrived, I couldn’t actually start to form a definitive view anyway.”7
39.  The letter of instructions for Lord Goldsmith was not sent until 9 December and did
not include the point of view of Mr Michael Wood, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) Legal Adviser.
Cabinet, 14 November 2002
40.  Mr Straw told Cabinet on 14 November that, while the Security Council
would need to be reconvened to discuss any breach in the event of Iraqi
non‑compliance, the key aspect of resolution 1441 was that military action could
be taken without a further resolution.
41.  That statement reflected the position Mr Straw had taken in his discussion
with Lord Goldsmith on 12 November, but it did not fully reflect the advice
Mr Straw had been given by the Mr Wood on 6 November or the concerns
Lord Goldsmith had expressed on 12 November.
42.  The advice given by Mr Wood is described in Section 3.5.
43.  In the discussion of Iraq and the adoption of resolution 1441 in Cabinet on
14 November, Mr Straw stated that a “key aspect of the resolution was that there was
no requirement for a second resolution before action was taken against Iraq in the event
of its non-compliance, although reconvening the Security Council to discuss any breach
was clearly stated”.8
44.  Lord Goldsmith was not present at that Cabinet meeting.
“Material breach” and the need for advice
45.  Concerns about the differences between the UK and the US on what would
constitute a material breach, the US stance of “zero tolerance” and the debate in
the US on “triggers” for military action were already emerging.
46.  Mr Blair and Mr Straw, and their most senior officials, were clearly aware that
difficult and controversial questions had yet to be resolved in relation to:
what would constitute a further material breach and how and by whom that
would be determined;
the issue of whether a further resolution would be needed to authorise
force; and
the implications of a veto.
7 Public hearing, 27 January 2010, pages 55-56.
8 Cabinet Conclusions, 14 November 2002.
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