The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

when UK forces moved into overwatch in the last province of Basra, we reduced

force numbers to around 4,500. Since then, numbers have been reduced further,

to their current level of around 4,000.

“Before the events of the last week, the emerging military advice … was that the

further reductions might not be possible at the rate envisaged in the October

announcement, although it remains our clear direction of travel and our plan.

In the light of the last week’s events, however, it is prudent that we pause further

reductions while the current situation is unfolding.”459

935.  In the debate that followed his statement, Mr Browne was asked by Mr Adam Price

whether ISF action was disproportionately targeting JAM over other militia and whether

UK forces were therefore being drawn into taking sides in a civil war. Mr Browne said

that the available information suggested that the Iraqi Security Forces were taking on a

“complex mixture of criminal elements and gangs”, including JAM.460 JAM had attracted

particular attention because Muqtada al-Sadr was a “significant player” in the Iraqi

political process. However, to “suggest that the Iraqi security forces had been taking

on only one element of the militia and criminal gang elements in Basra would be to

misrepresent what they have been doing”.

936.  Mr Browne also told MPs that it was well known that Iranian elements had been

“interfering substantially” in southern Iraq in a number of ways.461 He had no evidence to

suggest malign involvement by Iran over the past week but there was “no question but

that some of those people have been trained and equipped by Iran”.462

937.  On 1 April, Prime Minister Maliki announced that he was going to supplement the

ISF with 10,000 Basra citizens in a “Sons of Iraq” programme that he had developed

with the local tribes.463

938.  Maj Gen White-Spunner commented that a sufficiently robust governance

structure would be required to prevent this group turning into another armed militia and

a considered approach would be needed to prevent them becoming a new target set

for JAM. Whilst the establishment of such a programme in MND(SE) was something

that the UK had sought to avoid and continued to oppose, he observed that “our voice

carries little weight and there is little that we can and ought to do other than support the

MNC-I in developing recommendations”.

939.  Mr Brown spoke to President Bush on the afternoon of 1 April.464 His Private

Secretary’s record of the conversation indicates that they did not discuss Iraq but looked

forward to a “full discussion” in the future.

459  House of Commons, Official Report, 1 April 2008, column 630.

460  House of Commons, Official Report, 1 April 2008, column 637.

461  House of Commons, Official Report, 1 April 2008, columns 635-636.

462  House of Commons, Official Report, 1 April 2008, column 643.

463  Minute White-Spunner to CJO, 3 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 3 April 2008’.

464  Letter Fletcher to Gould, 1 April 2008, ‘NATO: Prime Minister’s telephone call with Bush, 1 April’.

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