The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
resolution”,
it would be “hard for anyone to object” if Dr Blix agreed. The
provisions of
resolution
1284 could “run in parallel”. Sir David and Dr Rice also
discussed whether
Dr Blix
could be encouraged to call for Saddam Hussein’s full co‑operation
to resolve
the issues
in his report to the Security Council.
532.
Sir David
and Dr Rice also discussed the “immediate tasks” for
Dr Blix, including:
•
an audit of
Iraq’s declaration;
•
an
energetic programme of site inspections;
•
a process
of interviews without minders; and
•
whether he
should destroy proscribed items.
533.
They also
discussed Iraq’s deceptions and concerns about whether
UNMOVIC
could
ensure that information about future inspections did not reach
Iraqi officials.
534.
Sir David
commented that, “as far as the battle for public opinion was
concerned”,
the
UK:
“… needed
hard evidence that Saddam had WMD if we could possibly get it,
which
meant
allowing time for us to acquire and deploy the intelligence. There
was a
suspicion
in the UK that we were rushing our fences. It would be very
difficult to
persuade
people … that [the Security Council on] 27 January should do more
than
take note
of Dr Blix’s report … [I]t was too soon to try to use it as
the moment when
we could
demonstrate that the inspection system had failed.”
535.
Sir David
asked Dr Rice about developments in her thinking about how
the
US Administration
would handle the meeting and immediate follow‑up. Dr Rice
replied
that
Secretary Powell would not present the US case on Iraq’s deception
until after
the meeting
between President Bush and Mr Blair on 31 January. President
Bush
would “not
want to give the impression that he was presenting the Prime
Minister with
a fait
accompli”.
536.
Sir David
reported that he had welcomed that assurance, and pointed out
that
Mr Blair
had taken a very robust line at his press conference on 13 January;
but “there
was
nevertheless a great deal of uneasiness and opposition to
Government policy …
We had to
take account of this …”
537.
Sir David
added that he had “repeated that this meant there was a premium
on
producing
hard evidence if we could, and allowing the inspection process more
time.
This was
also necessary if we were to get the support we needed for a second
UNSCR.”
538.
Responding to
Dr Rice’s view that President Bush would want to take
advantage
of the
current military window, Sir David had stated that he
“realised this”, but “additional
days and
weeks mattered in the battle for public opinion … the UK needed
timeline[s] for
decisions
that were no earlier than March or April, not January or
February.”
96