10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or in consultation with

the Iraqi interim administration.

471.  Particular actions that the resolution appeared to mandate were:

• promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable

development;

• promoting human rights; and

• encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform.

472.  To the extent that such actions were not otherwise authorised elsewhere in the

resolution or under occupation law, then there was a clear requirement to act only in

co-ordination with the SRSG.

473.  Ms Adams also advised that the resolution clearly imposed joint US/UK

responsibility for disbursements from the DFI, and that it was therefore important to

ensure that the US Government did not take actions in relation to the DFI which were

incompatible with the resolution. She continued:

“The fact that the resolution imposes joint responsibility gives the UK a locus to

argue with the US that we should be fully involved in the decision-taking process.

Anything less would be legally risky.”

474.  Ms Adams concluded that the resolution did not grant the Coalition full legislative

and executive authority in Iraq, so there was still a need to consider the legality

of specific proposals against the requirements of occupation law and the terms of

the resolution.

475.  The following day, 10 June, the CPA issued a regulation that gave Ambassador

Bremer, as “Administrator of the CPA”, authority to oversee and control the

establishment, administration and use of the DFI and to direct disbursements from

the DFI “for those purposes he determines to be for the benefit of the Iraqi people”.259

476.  The regulation also established a Program Review Board (PRB) to develop funding

plans and make recommendations to Ambassador Bremer on expenditures from the

DFI, “in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration, when established”.

477.  On 12 June, Mr Brenton wrote to Sir David Manning addressing the “considerable

concern around Whitehall that our views are not being taken sufficiently into account in

the formulation of policy on governing Iraq”.260 Mr Brenton described the CPA regulation

on the DFI as “obviously flawed” from the UK’s perspective, and the latest and most

serious example of that.

259  Coalition Provisional Authority, Regulation No.2, 10 June 2003, Development Fund for Iraq.

260  Letter Brenton to Manning, 12 June 2003, ‘Iraq: UK/US Cooperation’.

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