9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
troop
numbers from 7,100 to 4,500 in May 2007, and possible further
reductions later in
the
year.
328.
The paper
acknowledged that, in presentational terms, it would be
“extremely
important
to portray our plans as directly linked to supporting the Iraq
Government and
provincial
transfer decisions are Iraqi led”.
329.
The Basra
paper was written by the FCO and considered the civilian
implications
of the
military plan and the “heightened security threat”.182
FCO
officials recommended
aiming for
Provincial Iraqi Control in Basra at some point between March and
June 2007.
Activity
required to achieve that would be led from Basra Air Station as
“there is no
prospect of
our being able to recommend to Ministers a return to full staffing
at Basra
Palace in
the near future”. Although that meant limited numbers of staff and
“tougher”
conditions,
the FCO observed that “there will
be significant advantages in co‑location
with the
military – making possible a more cohesive approach”.
330.
At its meeting
on 7 December, DOP(I) agreed the overall intent of both the
civilian
and
military plans, and agreed that progress on the Forward Plan should
be considered
at its next
meeting.183
In
discussion, the point was made that:
“It would
be important to get the optics right. We should not be seen to be
driven out
by IDF
[indirect fire], and it should be possible to suppress indirect
fire for a limited
period to
enable this to occur.”
331.
On 7 December,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary spoke to a contact in the US
National
Security
Council to learn about US views on UK proposals for Basra and
transition in the
South.184
The Private
Secretary reported to Sir Nigel Sheinwald that they had
generated
“a lot of
discomfort” amongst the US military.
332.
Mr Blair
discussed the Iraq Study Group report “at length” with President
Bush over
a private
breakfast at the White House on 7 December.185
The Inquiry
has not seen a
record of
that discussion.
333.
A record by
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary of the formal talks that followed
indicates
that
Mr Blair said that the mission remained the same, but the
strategy needed
adjustment.
Three things were needed:
•
to set out
the terms of support for the Iraqi Government, which should do
more
on
reconstruction, security and economic capacity
building;
•
more
support for Iraq from the region; and
•
a whole
Middle East strategy.
182
Paper FCO
officials, 1 December 2006, ‘Basra: Objectives and Presence in
2007’.
183
Minutes, 7
December 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
184
Minute
Banner to Sheinwald, 7 December 2006, ‘Iraq – NSC
Views’.
185
Letter
Phillipson to Hayes, 8 December 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s Talks with
President Bush, 7 December:
Middle East
Issues and Afghanistan’.
63