The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
314.
At the end of
November 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously
adopted
resolution
1723 (2006).173
At the
formal request of Prime Minister Maliki, this extended
the legal
basis for the presence and activities of the MNF in Iraq, and
arrangements for
putting oil
receipts into the Development Fund of Iraq, until December
2007.
315.
President Bush
wrote in his memoir that the US Administration had reviewed
its
strategy
for Iraq during the second half of 2006.174
It had
focused on three options:
•
to
accelerate the existing strategy of training Iraqi forces while
withdrawing US
forces;
•
to pull US
troops back from Baghdad until the sectarian violence burnt out;
or
•
to deploy
additional US troops to conduct a full‑scale
counter‑insurgency
campaign in
Baghdad.
316.
Before
deciding on the third option President Bush sought assurances from
Prime
Minister
Maliki that he would commit more Iraqi forces, not interfere in
joint military
operations,
confront Shia militias, and as security improved make progress on
political
reconciliation.
President Bush’s memoir records that Prime Minister Maliki gave
those
assurances
at a meeting on 29 November.
317.
On 30
November, Maj Gen Shireff commented that indirect fire, while
“extremely
unpleasant
and, at times fatal” was “not a showstopper” but rather a
“tactical
nuisance”.175
It had,
however, “had a strategic effect by forcing the very public
drawdown
of the FCO
and handed an IO [Information Operations] victory to the enemy on a
plate”.
He
explained that it was necessary to reduce the levels of indirect
fire “to avoid the
charge that
we have been bombed out of the City”.
318.
Maj Gen
Shirreff explained that there was “more we could and should do” but
he
was
hampered from doing so because he did not have the
equipment.
319.
On 6 December,
the JIC examined the level of control that different actors,
in
particular
Muqtada al‑Sadr, had over elements of JAM.176
320.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements included:
“I. Muqtada
al Sadr controls the large majority of Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM).
Most
‘mainstream’
JAM members are not routinely involved in violence against
the
Multi‑National
Forces (MNF). JAM militants are attacking the MNF and the
Sunni
population:
most claim allegiance to Sadr and accept broad direction from him,
but
launch
attacks for a variety of local reasons, frequently ignoring his
orders.
173
UN Security
Council, ‘5574th
Meeting 28
November 2006’ (SC/8879).
174
Bush
GW. Decision
Points. Virgin
Books, 2010.
175
Minute
Shirreff, 30 November 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
30 November 2006’.
176
JIC
Assessment, 6 December 2006, ‘Iraq: Who Controls Jaysh al
Mahdi?’
60