15.1 | Civilian
personnel
350.
The UK
military offered help in the short term where Embassy
requirements
matched its
plans, but was not in a position to provide a regular
service.243
351.
On 1 December,
the Chiefs of Staff agreed an FCO request for helicopter
support
to the
British Embassy Baghdad.244
352.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit informed Sir Michael Jay that the military would
provide the best
service it
could over the next couple of weeks and was looking at the
possibility of
making
additional helicopters available from Northern
Ireland.245
353.
Mr Straw
raised the issue with Sir Nigel Sheinwald, who told him
Mr Blair would
be ready
to write to the MOD to ensure its support
continued.246
354.
The FCO Senior
Overseas Security Adviser (SOSA) visited Basra and
Baghdad
in March
2005.247
Security
arrangements at both posts were reported to be “first
class”.
All staff
were said to have confidence in the security arrangements, which
allowed them
“to work
with a reasonably comfortable feeling in a very hostile
environment”. Two issues
were
highlighted:
•
A
continuing shortage in Baghdad and Basra of ECMs for preventing
remote
detonation
of IEDs. Additional suites of ECMs had been ordered, but more
were
needed.
•
A
substantial reinforcement of US patrolling along the Baghdad
Airport
road since
the beginning of 2005. If the number of incidents along the
road
remained
low, the British Embassy might be able to re‑assess whether it
could
be used
again.
355.
In May 2005,
in his valedictory as Head of the IPU, Mr Crompton
advised:
“… we need
to sell the notion that military assets (particularly transport)
belong to
HMG as a
whole and that decisions on how they are used are determined by
HMG,
rather than
MOD/PJHQ on the basis of military priorities, occasionally in ways
which
have not
best served wider HMG objectives”.248
356.
Section 9.4
describes the further deterioration in security during the second
half
of 2005, at
the same time as the Government started to discuss the consequences
for
civilian
activities of the planned drawdown of UK military forces from
southern Iraq.
243
Letter
Asquith to Houghton, 29 November 2004, ‘Request for Help with
Helicopter Transport for British
Embassy,
Baghdad Between Green Zone and BIAP’.
244
Minutes, 1
December 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
245
Minute Jay
to Private Secretary [FCO], 1 December 2004,
[untitled].
246
Minute Owen
to IPU [junior official], 2 December 2004, ‘Iraq: Helicopter
Transport’.
247
Minute
Security Strategy Unit [junior official] to Asquith, 14 March 2005,
‘SSU Visit to Iraq’.
248
Minute
Crompton to Sawers, 4 May 2005, ‘Iraq Reflections’.
305