The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
654.
In a separate
telegram on post-conflict issues sent the same day, Sir
Christopher
Meyer
reported that the US media, briefed by an unnamed senior official,
was saying
that US
views were coalescing around the idea of Iraq being governed by a
US military
commander
in the initial period after Saddam Hussein’s
removal.328
Sir
Christopher
explained
that US Government views were yet to crystallise, but there was a
strong
inclination
towards that approach, which was at odds with the UN-led solution
in the
recent FCO
paper.
655.
Sir
Christopher concluded:
“The bottom
line is that the US will be firmly in the driving seat in
organising any
post-Saddam
administration. We need to wake up to this reality and consider
how
best we can
align ourselves to ensure not only a stable Iraq but also the
maximum
benefit for
UK plc.”
656.
On 14 October,
the Cabinet Office produced a grid of military and
non-military
contingency
planning under way in Whitehall. Organised into “external” and
“domestic”
issues,
work ranged from the FCO paper on administering post-Saddam Hussein
Iraq to
an ACPO
review of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism
policing.329
657.
The grid
listed 11 papers attributed to the FCO, including the five already
circulated
to the
AHGI, and six others, “not yet ready for circulation”,
covering:
•
consular
contingencies in the region;
•
reopening
an Embassy in Baghdad (see Section 15.1);
•
economic
issues in Iraq and the region;
•
SSR in
Iraq;
•
the
vulnerabilities of UK diplomatic missions in the region;
and
•
contingency
planning for a CBW attack on UK diplomatic missions.
658.
The record of
the meeting of the AHGI on 11 October stated that
“sanitised”
versions of
the FCO paper on consequences of conflict had been shared with the
US,
and the
scenarios for post-conflict Iraq with the US, France and
Germany.330
659.
The Cabinet
Office grid listed three “external” MOD contingency planning
activities:
•
UK/US
military liaison;
•
discussion
of Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) with the Treasury
and
industry;
and
•
reorganisation
of Operation FRESCO, the contingency plans to manage a
prospective
firefighters’ strike (see Section 6.1).
328
Telegram
1327 Washington to FCO London, 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: The Day
After: US Views’.
329
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 14 October 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’ attaching Paper
Cabinet Office,
14 October
2002, ‘Whitehall Iraq Contingency Planning’.
330
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 14 October 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
224