The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
369.
In response to
urgings that Iraq should implement the requirement in
resolution
687 to
enact legislation implementing the UN prohibitions on WMD, Iraq had
told
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA earlier that day that it had issued a Presidential
Decree.
The text
was being studied.
370.
Addressing the
role of intelligence, Dr Blix stated that in the closed
society of
Iraq, and
the history of inspections, “other sources of information, such as
defectors
and
government intelligence agencies” were “required to aid the
inspection process”.
International
organisations then needed to analyse such information
critically.
371.
Dr Blix
added that intelligence had been useful for UNMOVIC, and in one
case
had led
to the discovery of documents relating to laser enrichment of
uranium:
“In other
cases, intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items
were
found. Even
in such cases, however, inspection of these sites were useful
in
proving the
absence of such items and in some cases the presence of
other
items –
conventional munitions. It shows that conventional arms are being
moved
around the
country and their presence is not necessarily related to weapons
of
mass destruction.”
372.
Referring to
Secretary Powell’s presentation on 5 February, and in particular
the
suggestion
that “Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and
removing
evidence of
proscribed weapons programmes”, Dr Blix stated that he wanted
to
comment on
“the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical
decontamination
at a
munitions depot”. That depot was a declared site, and one that Iraq
would have
expected
UNMOVIC to inspect. Dr Blix stated that: “We have noted that
the two satellite
images of
the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of
munitions
at the site
could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of
proscribed
munitions
in anticipation of imminent inspection.” He added that: “Our
reservation on this
point does
not detract from our appreciation of the briefing.”
373.
Concluding his
report, Dr Blix commented that:
“UNMOVIC is
not infrequently asked how much more time it needs to complete
its
task in
Iraq. The answer depends on which task one has in mind … the
disarmament
task – or
the monitoring that no new proscribed activities occur
…
“…
Regrettably the high degree of co-operation required of Iraq for
disarmament
through
inspection was not forthcoming in 1991 …
“If Iraq
had provided the necessary co-operation in 1991, the phase of
disarmament
… could
have been short and a decade of sanctions could have been
avoided.
Today,
three months after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002) the
period of
disarmament
through inspection could still be short if ‘immediate, active
and
unconditional
cooperation’ with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be
forthcoming.”
246