The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

674. Lt Gen Reith stated that it would be “easier, militarily, to ratchet down than ratchet

up any forces offered”, but the “COS acknowledged that it might be unattractive

politically,269 to deliver less than that which had initially been offered”.

675. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that the package recommended by Lt Gen Reith was a

viable option, subject to resolving the constraints which had been identified; and that an

armoured brigade represented the smallest force that could act autonomously.

676. Lt Gen Reith told the Inquiry:

“I got a briefing on the northern option from my own staff on the 18 September,

having done operational analysis on it, and it was clear that we couldn’t do it on our

own, even with a full division.”270

677. When Mr Hoon discussed the options with his most senior advisers later that day,

Adm Boyce told him that there was “clearer [US] understanding of the importance of

operations in northern Iraq to ‘fix’ Iraqi forces”.271 Gen Franks had indicated that it would

be “helpful if the UK could provide in the North an armoured brigade and a 2-star tactical

lead” which would command US forces.

678. Adm Boyce added that the Chiefs of Staff had continuing doubts about whether

the US had a winning concept.

679. When Package 3 was discussed, Mr Hoon requested clarification of the length of

time necessary to deploy a land contribution.

680. Adm Boyce said that early decisions would be needed on UORs, reserves

and units which were allocated to Op FRESCO. Package 3 would also require a

“£1bn premium”, which “could exhaust the Reserve”.

681. Mr Hoon agreed that, subject to No.10’s agreement, Lt Gen Reith would be able to

indicate to CENTCOM, for planning purposes and with the caveat that no final political

decision had been taken, that two separate UK contributions could potentially be

available:

• Package 2, which offered a “significant and useful contribution to any US led

action”; and

• Package 3 as a possible add‑on, with guidance that the US should also plan

without it.

682. Mr Hoon also asked for a detailed breakdown of the estimated costs of UORs for

a meeting with Mr Brown on 23 September.

269 The Inquiry considers this to be a reference to the potential impact on US/UK relations, not a comment

on the views of politicians.

270 Private hearing, 15 January 2010, page 23

271 Minute Watkins to PSO/CDS, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK Contribution to any US‑led

Action’.

276