The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
152.
The shortfall
of essential items for Packages 1 and 2 was for NBC equipment
that
would be
required to treat casualties in the event of an Iraqi biological
attack. The MOD
had “low
confidence” that it could be obtained within six months. It could
take “up to nine
months” to
procure certain stocks from industry but further work was needed to
identify
other
possible sources.
153.
For
enhancements required to achieve full operational capability, the
MOD had “a high
degree of
confidence” that work could be completed “within six months” for
Packages 1
and 2.
For those packages, “none of the enhancement items appear to be a
showstopper”.
154.
For Package 3,
the MOD had “lower confidence” in the ability to
deliver
desertisation
for tanks “for the fully sustained war-fighting role”, which it
judged
“would take
around ten months”. There would also be a shortfall in NBC
protection
and biological
detectors if Package 3 were to be adopted. Further work
was
being done to
see how quickly this could be acquired.
155.
The purchase
of ammunition and spares for land forces and support
helicopters
was listed
in the annex of equipment which was “essential now” to sustain
operations
if Package
3 were to be adopted.
156.
The official
wrote that “the earlier decisions are taken to start Urgent
Operational
Requirements
(UOR) and sustainability acquisition, the greater the UK’s
preparedness
and
choice”.
157.
The MOD
official requested approval to engage the Front Line Commands,
the
DPA and the
DLO to “refine” the MOD’s work on lead times. This was “most
pressing”
where the
MOD had “low confidence that activity or procurement deemed
essential to
the UK
force packages” could be achieved within six months.
158.
The official
would seek further approval before the MOD made “any contact
with
industry to
determine the actual lead-times” for procuring
equipment.
159.
On funding,
Mr Hoon was advised that, as any UORs for a campaign in Iraq
would
fall
outside the MOD’s budget, it would need agreement from the Treasury
to call on the
Reserve and
to secure funding for the UOR equipment and enhancement
measures.
160.
The Reserve is
a fund held by the Treasury intended for genuinely
unforeseen
contingencies
which departments cannot manage from their own resources and
was
used to pay
for the net additional costs of military operations (NACMO). The
NACMO
included
both UOR and non-UOR expenditure associated with operations in
Iraq. The
process
behind this is explained in Section 13.1, where MOD’s negotiations
with the
Treasury
are also examined.
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