The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
283.
Addressing
Iraq’s WMD capability, Mr McDonald wrote:
“There is
real reason for concern about Iraq’s WMD programmes, principally
CBW
and long
range missiles. There is evidence of continuing Iraqi attempts to
procure
nuclear-related
materiel. Saddam’s history of aggression and use of CW sets
Iraq
apart from
other WMD-armed states. It might be possible to construct a
(threadbare)
legal case
for military action to deal with the threat. But a new SCR would
almost
certainly
be needed. And though bombing can degrade missile and even
nuclear
capability,
it is ineffective against CBW …”
284.
An Annex to
the letter set out the FCO perspective on Iraq’s WMD capabilities
and
intentions
and Iraq’s response to its obligations. That stated Iraq
was:
•
“concealing
information about large quantities of chemical and
biological
munitions,
agents and precursors. UNSCOM
inspectors were unable to
account for
[material related to chemical weapons] and very large quantities
of
growth
media acquired, on Iraq’s own admission, for the production of
biological
weapons”;
•
“concealing
up to 20 long-range Al Hussein missiles”;
•
“actively
pursuing chemical and biological weapons and ballistic
missiles.
The
missile-related facilities damaged by Operation Desert Fox in 1998
have
been
repaired, research continues and new facilities are being
constructed.
Other
former chemical and biological weapons facilities have been
restored:
some CW and
BW‑relevant activity is under way”;
•
“seeking to
rebuild a nuclear weapons programme. Recent
intercepted
Iraqi
procurement efforts have involved material relevant to production
of fissile
material”;
and
•
“most
importantly, barring
entry to UNMOVIC and IAEA Action Team
Inspectors. Iraqi
officials have made clear as recently as last week that
they
do not
intend to cease this obstruction until sanctions are lifted: in
defiance of
UNSCRs
which repeatedly call for Iraqi compliance to be unconditional.”
285.
The JIC’s
assessment of Iraq’s WMD at that time is addressed in Section
4.1.
286.
On the way
ahead, Mr McDonald wrote:
“A strategy
to deal with a WMD threat will require ratcheting up our present
policy of
containment.
We should press Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations
under
the SCRs,
accept an intrusive and continuing UN inspection regime and
accept
Kuwaiti
sovereignty unequivocally.”
287.
The strategy
“could involve” four elements:
“… making
previously declared red-lines for military action more specific; by
defining
what we
meant by reconstitution of WMD and threats to
neighbours.
360