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3.8  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003
320.  Mr Ivanov agreed to analyse the proposals and respond.
MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 12 MARCH 2003
321.  Mr Blair decided not to seek to extend the deadline of 17 March. In a
telephone call with President Bush on 12 March, he proposed only that the US
and UK should continue to seek a compromise in the UN, while confirming that
he knew it would not happen. He would say publicly that France had prevented
a resolution.
322.  Mr Blair sought President Bush’s help in handling the debate in the House of
Commons planned for Tuesday 18 March, where he would face a major challenge
to win a vote supporting military action.
323.  Mr Blair wanted:
to avoid a gap between the end of the negotiating process and the
Parliamentary vote in which France or another member of the Security
Council might table a resolution that attracted support from the majority
of the Council; and
US statements on the publication of a Road Map on the MEPP and the
need for a further resolution on a post-conflict Iraq.
324.  On the afternoon of 12 March, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the latest
position and the difficulties with Chile and Mexico.106
325.  In preparation for the call, Mr Rycroft advised Mr Blair that he needed “to decide if
you want to ask for the further week”.107 If he did, Mr Blair could “make the case for trying
over the next 24 hours to secure a UN resolution based on the Blix agreed tests with the
revised deadline of 24 March (or whatever he [President Bush] accepts)”.
326.  If Mr Blair decided not to make the case for more time or it was rejected by
President Bush, Mr Rycroft advised Mr Blair to set out a “fallback”:
He had “not given up hope of trying to secure a second resolution” and he
knew that President Bush “wanted to get out of the UN morass”, but he needed
“a further 24 hours” to see if he could “get the Chileans to put forward a
serious proposal”.
It was “important” that the US did not “publicly lose interest in the UN route”
because of concerns that an alternative resolution with a “long, e.g. 45-day,
time-line” could be put forward which “could attract 11 votes”.
106  Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Telephone Conversation with
President Bush, 12 March’.
107  Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 12 March 2003, ‘Bush Call’.
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