The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
482.
In the paper,
the IPU explained that:
“The
political and security context for our civilian operations in
southern Iraq is
changing
significantly. The heightened security threat, which forced us to
draw down
staff from
Basra Palace in October, shows no sign of abating. We expect
security
responsibility
in Basra to be transferred to the Iraqis in spring 2007. And MOD
are
considering
a major reposturing of UK forces in the coming months, with
direct
implications
for civilian operations.
“… In the
political and security environment we are likely to face, what can
we
realistically
hope to deliver? What civilian resources do we need to deliver
those
objectives,
and where should they best be deployed?” 321
483.
The IPU
strongly recommended that the UK “maintain a civilian effort in
Basra
province
during 2007”. The intention was to co‑locate as much as possible of
the civilian
effort with
MND(SE) at Basra Air Station, where plans were being pursued to
construct
suitable
hardened facilities, without closing off immediately the option of
returning to the
Basra
Palace site in future.
484.
The IPU
explained that the current PJHQ proposal was to close all bases
in
Basra City
by April 2007 and to consolidate at Basra Air Station. Two military
bases
would close
during January/February. The Basra Palace base, which was
essential
for
sustaining the civilian presence, would close by 1 March. If
Ministers agreed those
proposals,
there would be just 12 weeks to move personnel and equipment
from
the Basra
Palace site to Basra Air Station: “an extremely tight timetable,
given the
operational
constraints in theatre”.
485.
The IPU
advised that there was no prospect of being able to recommend
to
Ministers a
return to full staffing at the Basra Palace site in the near
future. It was equally
clear that
there was “a powerful and urgent imperative for us to get our
in‑country civilian
operations
back up to strength as quickly as possible, to deliver in the
critical period
ahead”.
486.
The IPU added
that conditions for staff at Basra Air Station would be
“much
tougher”
than at the Basra Palace site:
“Travel
to/from Basra will become much harder. We are likely to face
staff
recruitment
and retention challenges. Space will be limited. With only 54
hardened
units of
accommodation we will need to make difficult choices about
priorities.
“But
against that, there will
be significant advantages in co‑location with the
military
– making
possible a more cohesive approach than is currently possible
from
different
sites in Basra.”
321
Paper IPU,
1 December 2006, ‘Basra: Objectives and Presence in
2007’.
330