The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
260.
The first Key
Judgement stated:
“Iraq has a
chemical and biological weapons capability and Saddam is
prepared
to use
it.”
261.
The Butler
Report commented:
“The JIC
made clear that much of the [9 September] Assessment was based on
its
own
judgement, drawing on the work done for its Assessment of 21
August. But we
were struck
by the relative thinness of the intelligence base supporting the
greater
firmness of
the JIC’s judgements on Iraqi production and possession of
chemical
and
biological weapons, especially the inferential nature of much of
it.”118
262.
Sir John
Scarlett explained to the Inquiry that the “relationship between
collection,
dissemination,
comment, analysis, assessment and then policy-making was a
subtle
one”.119
Intelligence
reports were issued by the collection agency and there was
the
possibility
for that agency “to make a comment on the report and very often put
it into
context
compared with what other reports have said on a given subject”.
Reports were
then issued
to customers across government “particularly … in the Defence
Intelligence
Staff who
are … an important body of analysts”. Those customers played a role
in the
Current
Intelligence Groups, but it was the job of the Assessments Staff to
bring it all
together
into a “big picture assessment”.
263.
Sir John
Scarlett stated that the 9 September Assessment had a
“separate
judgement
on the capabilities which existed”; and that it was not intended to
be a worst
case
scenario. The change was the firm judgement on Iraq’s current
possession of
agents and
weapons which:
“… referred
to recent intelligence on the production of weapons now
taking
place, the
development of mobile systems and then, importantly, on the
regime
and
Saddam’s intent. The great importance that he attached to the
possession
of chemical
and biological weapons and his readiness to use them if
necessary,
including
to defend the regime from attack.
“He saw
possession as a central feature of his regional power position
and
continued
ability to project influence.
“That
intelligence on intent was significant – taken to be
significant.
“It was
also noted that we did not know specific plans for CBW use in the
event
of conflict,
the location of production facilities, the size of
stocks.”120
118
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
304.
119
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 17-18.
120
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 39-40.
162