The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
402.
Mr Quarrey
passed the DFID paper to Sir Nigel with the comment:
“This has
more detail than we’ve seen for a while, and in some areas
looks
reasonably
encouraging. But overall the picture is still pretty bleak. What
the paper
does
not give is (a)
much sense of what is happening now
(eg
what’s getting better
or worse);
and (b) whether there is much we can do about it. I think we have
other,
more
immediate priorities for No.10 effort in the short term. Do you
want to do
403.
Sir Nigel was
more critical:
“I take a
less positive view. I see it as a lot of useless, mostly input,
statistics. But
there’s
little on outputs, no comparison of pre-invasion and now, no case
studies,
no sense
of Najaf then and now. ie not what I
asked for.” 234
404.
The Inquiry
has seen no indication that the paper was passed to Mr Blair,
or that
No.10 or
Sir Nigel responded to DFID.
405.
Also on 30
September, Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary sent
Mr Quarrey a
paper
containing the joint advice of FCO, MOD and DFID officials on the
implications
of the
Jameat incident.235
Mr Straw
had not yet seen and agreed their advice.
The
FCO/MOD/DFID paper advised:
“The …
incident … highlights what was previously more opaque, that we face
acute
challenges
in achieving our objectives in the south-east region. Stability in
the
south‑east
is being threatened by intense rivalry among political parties and
their
militias.
Criminality, jockeying for patronage and leaders’ differing
political visions
are being
exacerbated by tribalism and increasing religiosity.”
406.
The paper
concluded that “alternative options to our current policy are
limited”:
“Our
only realistic option is to maintain our course and see the job
through.
But
we need to
make adjustments to our policy, while
sticking to our strategic
approach of
ensuring in due course successful transition of responsibility for
rule
of law
in the south-east to the Iraqis.”
407.
An immediate
problem was the threat of reprisal attacks. DFID and FCO staff
were
“essentially
locked down”.
233
Manuscript
comment Quarrey to Sheinwald, 4 October 2005, on Letter Dinham to
Sheinwald,
30 September
2005, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction Situation’.
234
Manuscript
comment Sheinwald to Quarrey, 6 October 2005, on Letter Dinham to
Sheinwald,
30 September
2005, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction Situation’.
235
Letter
Hayes to Quarrey, 30 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Basra’ attaching Paper
FCO/MOD/DFID,
30 September
2005, ‘South-East Iraq: Impact of Security Incident in
Basra’.
264