The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of
Operation SINBAD, and hoped that UK forces would remain in enough
strength to
play a
support role to Iraqi forces”.
345.
Over lunch,
President Talabani told Mr Blair that the Iraqi Army was
developing,
but needed
better logistics and was lacking arms and ammunition. He also
observed
that
“military success could only come through harnessing the support of
local people”.
346.
On 19
December, Sir David Manning wrote to Mr Sawers, and sent
copies
to Mr Peter
Hayes (Mrs Beckett’s Principal Private Secretary), Mr Peter
Ricketts
(FCO Permanent
Under Secretary), Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Mr Jonathan
Powell.190
347.
Sir David
reported signs that President Bush would reject the majority
of
recommendations
in the Iraq Study Group report and “dig in rather than exploit
the
opening
that the ISG report provides”. He wrote:
“… the
signs point to him [President Bush] adopting a contentious policy
of surging
additional
troops into Baghdad. The argument appears to be that this will
help
restore
order to the capital, and give Maliki the breathing space he needs
to go after
Sadr and
other militias. This may have a certain intellectual plausibility,
but there are
few in
Washington who believe in its political viability.”
348.
Mr Blair
wrote to President Bush on 20 December, in part to report his
recent
visit to
Iraq.191
He
emphasised the importance of support for Prime Minister
Maliki,
through
increasing the speed at which the Iraqi Army was developing,
supporting the
reconciliation
and outreach work, and helping to create a more effective system
for the
disbursement
of money within Iraq.
349.
Mr Blair
reported that, in MND(SE), he had found UK forces with
“surprisingly high
morale” and
in no doubt that Iran was the major player behind the
violence.
350.
On extra
troops for Baghdad Mr Blair wrote “It’s your call obviously …”
but added:
“For what
it’s worth, I think this might be sensible short term but only as
part of a
wider plan
to boost Iraqi capability. There is no doubt US forces can lock
down parts
of Baghdad.
But … it is only very short term respite. So there has to be Iraqi
force
plus
reconstruction.”
351.
Mr Blair
concluded his note by commenting: “My point is simply: whatever you
do,
the only
ultimate solution is Iraqi.”
352.
The following
day Sir David Manning reported that President Bush had
asked
Secretary
Gates to provide him with options for a possible surge of US forces
focused
on Baghdad
and Anbar province, but had not yet taken a
decision.192
190
Letter
Manning to Sawers, 19 December 2006, ‘Bush and
Baker‑Hamilton’.
191
Note [Blair
to Bush], [20 December 2006], ‘Note’.
192
eGram
56678/06 Washington to Various, 21 December 2006, ‘The “Review of
Reviews”. Where Next?’
66