4.4 | The
search for WMD
125.
AM Burridge
criticised CENTCOM’s handling of SSE operations in his
‘Hauldown
Report’ of
8 May.58
He
wrote:
“The scale
and complexity of SSE was underestimated by CENTCOM who
primarily
focused on
sites with WMD connections. They became fixated on the Weapons
of
Mass
Destruction Master Site List (WMSL) and there was unfounded
confidence
that the
‘smoking gun’ would be found during the exploitation of early
Priority 1
sites. With
the rapid collapse of the regime and the failure to find any
evidence
of WMD,
there was a realisation that the number of non-WMD sites was far
in
excess of
capability. These needed rapid exploitation before looting
destroyed any
potential
evidence. The diversity of agencies … and forces … involved
resulted
in a
fragmented approach … In addition, reporting mechanisms were
developed
well after
the start of operations, which resulted in confusion and inability
to
track progress.”
126.
AM Burridge
also criticised the US decision to embed media in XTF-75. The
“delay
in
establishing the facts associated with many discoveries” had led to
friction in the
command
chain.
127.
On
11 May, an article published in The Washington
Post described
the
replacement
of XTF-75 by the ISG as “a milestone in frustration for a major
declared
objective
of the war”, but recognised that:
“Even the
sharpest sceptics do not rule out that the hunt may eventually
find
evidence of
banned weapons. The most significant unknown is what
US
interrogators
are learning from senior Iraqi scientists, military industrial
managers
and Iraqi
government leaders now in custody … Publicly, the Bush
Administration
has
declined to discuss what the captured Iraqis are saying. In
private, US officials
provide
conflicting reports, with some hinting at important
disclosures.”59
128.
The article
attracted wide coverage and prompted sharply contrasting headlines
in
the
UK:
•
in
The
Telegraph:
“Americans keep up pressure on banned weapons”;60
•
in
The
Guardian: “Weapons
taskforce leaves in failure”.61
129.
The work of
XTF-75 was summarised in the introduction to the final report
of
the ISG,
published in September 2004:
“Many sites
were inspected but with an aim of discovering WMD, not
inspecting
and
developing an analytical assessment of the Iraqi programs. Wartime
conditions
58
Minute
Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation TELIC Hauldown
Report:
07 Feb 03 –
08 May 03’.
59
The
Washington Post,
11 May 2003, Frustrated,
US Arms Team to Leave Iraq.
60
The
Telegraph,
12 May 2003, Americans
keep up pressure on banned weapons.
61
The
Guardian,
12 May 2003, Weapons
taskforce leaves in failure.
449