The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
including
WMD, War Crimes and Terrorism, and would be fully effective in
about
four weeks.
It was clear that the US placed a different priority on WMD, which
was
near the
very top of the UK political agenda. Mr Howard would lead a UK
team to
Washington
… and would listen to American views, clarify their intentions …
and
emphasise
the importance the UK placed on the WMD issue. He would
report
back to the
Committee at their next meeting, after which the Chairman would
brief
96.
Mr Scarlett
subsequently asked Mr Howard to report on whether the
activities to
establish
the existence and scope of Iraq’s capabilities was being given a
sufficiently
high
priority in all parts of the US Administration. Depending on his
report, the JIC might
want to
recommend the possible appointment of a senior political figure to
oversee the
Coalition
effort on WMD.44
97.
On 21 and
22 April, Mr Howard led a UK team from the MOD, the FCO
and SIS to
Washington
to discuss the ISG with a US team including Major General Keith
Dayton,
its future
military commander.45
98.
The British
Embassy Washington reported after the talks that the ISG would
be
“substantial”,
with up to 2,000 personnel, and its task would be to “piece
together the
deeds of
Saddam’s regime, in particular the WMD programmes”. The US
Department
of Defense
(DoD) expected to have an initial operating capability in Iraq by
the end of
May and
that its work would take about six months. Maj Gen Dayton would
welcome
“a substantial
UK input”, including providing his Chief of Staff.
99.
The talks had
highlighted several “pressing issues”:
•
gaining
access in the short term to scientists and those involved in
concealment;
•
improving
the flow of information between theatre and capitals;
•
managing
public expectations about WMD discoveries; and
•
third-party
validation of those discoveries.
100.
US and UK
officials agreed that:
“…
Coalition forces in theatre needed to start to shift their
attention away from the
(well-known)
sensitive sites and onto finding the right people to interview.
High value
targets
were only part of the picture. Piecing together the puzzle would
depend just
as much on
the co-operation of mid-ranking officials.
“… The
immediate priority should be for the commanders in theatre to set
up safe
zones and
reception points for Iraqis who wanted to provide information …
Former
UNSCOM
inspectors could then assist in interviews.”
43
Minutes,
16 April 2003, JIC meeting.
44
Letter
Scarlett to Howard, 22 April 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD Review: Your
Visit to the US’.
45
Telegram
534 Washington to FCO London, 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Setting Up
the Iraq Survey Group’.
444