3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
The
preliminary objective for UK policy in Iraq agreed by Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon in May,
and
recorded in Mr Hoon’s minute to Mr Blair of 31 May 2002
(see Section 3.3), was
revised in
October 2002.
Mr Stephen
Wright, FCO Deputy Under Secretary Defence and Intelligence, told
the first
FCO
co‑ordination meeting on 6 September that, following a conversation
with the Chiefs
of Staff,
he thought more work needed to be done on strategic campaign
objectives.224
Mr Bowen
sent a draft to Sir David Manning on 4 October, explaining that
“Whitehall would
find it
helpful” to agree objectives “for the present phase of activity”
and, “in particular, it
would help
us in formulating an information strategy”.225
The draft
stated that the UK’s prime objective was:
“… to rid
Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their
associated
programmes
and means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles (BM)
… in
accordance
with United Nations Security Council resolutions … an expression of
the
will of the
international community, with which Iraq has persistently failed to
comply,
thereby
perpetuating the threat to international peace and
security.”
Other
objectives included the desired end‑state for Iraq,226
to which
“and providing
effective
and representative government for its own people” had been added;
and
restoring
the authority of the UN. The draft also stated that: “Success in
achieving
our prime
objective should help deter the proliferation of WMD and
B[allistic] M[issiles]
more
generally.”
The Cabinet
Office draft identified the immediate priorities as:
•
achieving “a
tough new UNSCR”;
•
the return of
inspectors to Iraq “under conditions which enable them to identify
and
eliminate
prohibited WMD/BM material, associated equipment and
activity”;
•
enabling
UNMOVIC and the IAEA to institute a regime of long‑term monitoring
and
verification
measures to ensure compliance;
•
maintaining
“international solidarity behind the UN Security Council and
support
for
effective … action” by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;
•
preserving
regional stability; and
•
continuing to
“make military plans and preparations in case military action”
was
required to
“force compliance with UNSCRs”.227
Mr Bowen
advised that some had argued that the aspirations for the future of
Iraq should
be
translated into the main objective. He had resisted:
“… on the
grounds that our purpose has been plainly stated by the Prime
Minister
as
disarmament and because the effective implementation of that policy
does not
necessarily
deliver our wider aspirations”.
224
Minute [FCO
junior official] to Grey [sic], 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq
Coordination Meeting’.
225
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Strategic Policy
Objectives’.
226
Agreed by
Mr Straw and Mr Hoon in May 2002 and included in the
Cabinet Office paper of 19 July,
‘Iraq:
Creating the Conditions for Military Action’, which was discussed
by Ministers on 23 July.
227
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Strategic Policy
Objectives’.
319